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WAI THROUGH KƖNƖWAI:
WATER FOR HAWAI‘I’S STREAMS AND
JUSTICE FOR HAWAIIAN COMMUNITIES
D. KAPUA‘ALA SPROAT *
I. INTRODUCTION: WAI THROUGH KƖNƖWAI 1
Kaulana NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ: “Famous are the Four Great Waters” of
Waihe‘e River, and Waiehu, ‘Ʈao, and Waikapǌ Streams in the heart of
2
Since time immemorial, KƗnaka Maoli (Native
Central Maui.
3
Hawaiians) revered the abundance of fresh water in Hawai‘i’s rivers
* Assistant Professor, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law,
University of Hawai‘i at MƗnoa, William S. Richardson School of Law. Mahalo piha to
KahikǌkalƗ Hoe for his unwavering support and aloha, as well as assistance with translations
and research. Mahalo nǌnui to Eric Yamamoto, Susan Serrano, Isaac Moriwake, and NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ’s water warriors for your invaluable inspiration and guidance. Mahalo nǀ ho‘i to
Natasha Baldauf, Teri Wright, Justin Levinson, and Dina Shek, for amazing support with
research, editing, and much more. Any errors are the author’s alone.
1. Wai means “water” in the Hawaiian language. MARY KAWENA PUKU‘I & SAMUEL
H. ELBERT, HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 377 (1986) [hereinafter HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY].
KƗnƗwai refers to a “[l]aw, code, rule, statute, act, regulation, ordinance, decree, [or] edict.”
Id. at 127. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between fresh water and the law in
Hawai‘i, see infra Part II.A.
2. Kaulana NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, or “famous are the four great waters,” is a well-known saying
about the NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ region of Central Maui that encompasses Waikapǌ, ‘Ʈao, Waiehu, and
Waihe‘e Streams and communities. TY P. KƖWIKA TENGAN, REPORT ON THE ARCHIVAL,
HISTORICAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES OF NƖ WAI ‘EHƖ, WAILUKU DISTRICT,
ISLAND OF MAUI 1–2 (2007) [hereinafter TENGAN REPORT] (explaining the historical
significance of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, including the saying “Kaulana NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ”). NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ was
and is historically and culturally significant due, in large part, to the abundance of fresh water
flowing in its rivers and streams. Id. at 1; see also E.S. CRAIGHILL HANDY & ELIZABETH
GREEN HANDY WITH THE COLLABORATION OF MARY KAWENA PUKU‘I, NATIVE
PLANTERS IN OLD HAWAI‘I: THEIR LIFE, LORE, & ENVIRONMENT 49697 (1972)
[hereinafter HANDY & HANDY].
3. KƗnaka Maoli or Maoli refers to the Indigenous population inhabiting Hawai‘i at the
time of Western contact in the late 1700s. HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 127
(noting that KƗnaka Maoli historically referred to a “full-blooded Hawaiian person”). In the
context of this article, however, these terms refer to Indigenous Hawaiians without reference
to blood quantum and may be used interchangeably with native Hawaiian, Native Hawaiian,
or Hawaiian. Some scholars use “native Hawaiian” to refer to individuals with 50% or more
blood quantum and “Native Hawaiian” to refer to individuals with less than 50% blood
quantum. Native and Indigenous are also capitalized to acknowledge the unique legal and
political status of these groups. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and

12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

128

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 12:41 PM

[95:127

and streams, including NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, as a physical embodiment of
4
KƗneikawaiola, a gift from the gods that brought life to the earth.
Traditional songs about this area, such as “NƗ Wai Kaulana” by Alice
Namakelua, beckon listeners to “e ‘ike i nƗ wai ‘ehƗ . . . ‘o nƗ wai
kaulana ia a o ku‘u ‘Ɨina,” “behold the four great streams . . . which are
5
the famous waters of my home.”
Today, NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s legendary waters are a mere trickle of their
former selves. For the last 150 years, massive diversion systems have
drained these streams almost completely dry to subsidize plantation
agriculture—and sugar cane in particular—on Maui’s Central Plain,
devastating the natural ecosystems and cultures that relied upon free6
flowing streams. Plantation agriculture’s wholesale appropriation and
redirection of surface water in this region physically and spiritually
disemboweled KƗnaka Maoli communities, whose Indigenous culture is
7
heavily dependent on natural resources, including fresh water. These
diversions thus imposed significant cultural harms, many of which
8
remain unaddressed to this day.
As the heyday of plantation agriculture comes to a close, however,
and all but one sugar plantation has left the islands, some on Maui have
9
dared to dream of a different future. KƗnaka Maoli are banding
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
4. KƗneikawaiola, or “KƗne of the life-giving waters,” refers to one of the four principal
akua (gods or ancestors) in the Maoli pantheon who is associated with fresh water resources.
See HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 63 (“Water, whether for irrigation, for drinking, or
other domestic purposes, was something that ‘belonged’ to Kane-i-ka-wai-ola (Procreator-inthe-water-of-life), and came through the meteorological agency of Lono-makua the Rainprovider.”); HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 128.
Fresh water as a life-giver was not to the Hawaiians merely a physical element; it
had a spiritual connotation. . . . [T]he ‘Water of Life of Kane’ is referred to over
and over again. Kane the word means ‘male’ and ‘husband’ was the embodiment of
male procreative energy in fresh water, flowing on or under the earth in springs, in
streams and rivers, and falling as rain (and also as sunshine), which gives life to
plants. . . . Regardless of all such distinctions, life-giving waters were sacred.
HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 64.
5. See NƗ Wai Kaulana, in ALICE NAMAKELUA & HEINZ-GUENTHER PINK, AUNTY
ALICE NAMAKELUA’S LIFETIME HAWAIIAN COMPOSITIONS (1973); RICHARD HO‘OPI‘I, NƗ
Wai Kaulana, on ULULANI (The Mountain Apple Co. 2003).
6. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1518.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 19.
9. Andrew Gomes, Sugar Plantation Gets Reprieve, HONOLULU ADVERTISER
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together with environmental groups and others to utilize existing legal
tools to return diverted flows to their streams and communities of
10
origin.
In June 2004, the KƗnaka Maoli group Hui o NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ and Maui
11
Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. (collectively, the “Hui”) partnered with
12
the public interest litigation firm Earthjustice to petition Hawai‘i’s
13
water commission to restore continuous mauka to makai flow to NƗ
(Jan. 30, 2010), http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2010/Jan/30/bz/hawaii1300309.html
(discussing the decline of plantation agriculture in Hawai‘i and community efforts to restore
stream flow); Liza Simon, Streams of Controversy, KA WAI OLA, March 2010, at 10–11
(detailing community efforts to restore stream flow in the wake of sugar plantation declines);
see also Restore Stream Flow, EARTHJUSTICE, http://www.restorestreamflow.org (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011) (disucssing more on community efforts to restore diverted stream flows on
Maui).
10. See, e.g., Petition to Amend the Interim Instream Flow Standards for Waihe‘e, North
and South Waiehu, ‘Ʈao and Waikapǌ Streams and Their Tributaries at 5–7, In re Petition to
Amend Interim Flow Standards (Haw. Water Comm’n June 25, 2004) [hereinafter Hui’s IIFS
Petition], available at http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/currentissues/iifsmaui2/General.pdf
(detailing Petitioners’ interests in the restored resources of local streams and waters); Simon,
supra note 9, at 11; DVD: Kaulana NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ: Restoring Maui’s Famous Streams,
EARTHJUSTICE, available at http://www.youtube.com/v/NZ2BmMcRBu0&hl=en_GB&fs=1&
(detailing recent efforts to restore streams and communities in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, Maui); E-mail
from Tricia Kehaulani Watson, President, Honua Consulting, to author (Aug. 29, 2011, 11:34
HAST) (on file with author) (sending the text of an article to the author written by Dr.
Watson entitled It’s Time for Balance in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, as published on the now-defunct
HONOLULU ADVERTISER BLOG, Oct. 12, 2009).
11. Letter from Isaac H. Moriwake et al., Attorneys, Earthjustice and Maui Tomorrow
Foundation, Inc., to Laura Thielen, Chairperson, Commission on Water and Resource
Management (June 26, 2009), available at http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/swma/swupobjections/2
0090626HuioNaWaiEha.PDF. Hui o NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ is a KƗnaka Maoli name that means group
or supporters of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, or the Four Great Waters. It is a largely Native, communitybased organization established to promote the conservation and management of Hawai‘i’s
natural resources and cultural practices that depend on them. See id. Maui Tomorrow
Foundation is a community-based organization.
See generally MAUI TOMORROW
FOUNDATION, http://maui-tomorrow.org/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). It is dedicated to
sustainable planning, responsible resource management, and preserving the opportunity for
rural lifestyles on Maui. Id.
12. Earthjustice is the nation’s leading non-profit environmental law firm. See
Earthjustice, About Us, http://www.earthjustice.org/about (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The
Mid-Pacific Office opened its Honolulu doors in 1988 and represents a range of
environmental, KƗnaka Maoli, and other community organizations. Earthjustice, MidPacific, http://www.earthjustice.org/about/offices/mid-pacific (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
13. The Commission on Water Resource Management, or water commission as it is
more popularly known, is an administrative agency housed within Hawai‘i’s Department of
Land and Natural Resources. The water commission implements article XI, sections 1 and 7
of Hawai‘i’s Constitution as well as Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 174C and is responsible
for managing and protecting Hawai‘i’s ground and surface water resources. See HAW. REV.
STAT. § 174C-5 (1993) (detailing the Commission’s general powers and duties); About Us:
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Wai ‘EhƗ’s streams and communities. 14 Over seven years of stillongoing litigation ensued. The Hui and its allies, including the Office of
15
detailed the water commission’s
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA),
constitutional, statutory, and moral obligations to return flows sufficient
to rebuild Native culture and practices, restore ecological balance, and
improve social welfare conditions—all set within the broader context of
the state’s commitment to reconciliation with and restorative justice for
16
KƗnaka Maoli.

Law & Regulations, COMMISSION ON WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT,
http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/aboutus_regulations.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (detailing the
origin of the water commission).
14. Hui’s IIFS Petition, supra note 10, at 2. “Mauka to makai flow” refers to continuous
stream flow from the upper reaches of the mountains until that stream flows into the ocean.
D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, Water, in THE VALUE OF HAWAI‘I: KNOWING THE PAST, SHAPING
THE FUTURE 187, 188 (Craig Howes & Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo’ole Osorio eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Sproat, Water].
15. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, or OHA, is a state agency that was established as a
result of Hawai‘i’s 1978 Constitutional Convention and is dedicated to the betterment of
native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. Establishment of OHA, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.oha.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=21&Itemid=125
(last visited Oct. 11, 2011). Since its first trustees were sworn-in in 1980, OHA has grown
significantly in size and scope and now manages almost 30,000 acres and $326.89 million in
revenues from the “ceded” lands trust. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 30, available at http://www.oha.org/pdf/OHA_Annual_Report_2010.pdf. OHA is
currently governed by nine trustees elected by the general populace.
Board of
Trustees, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.oha.org/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&task=section&id=6&Itemid=282 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). Four of the nine positions
are at-large seats that represent the state as a whole. Id. The remaining five positions are
representatives from geographic districts. Id. OHA’s mission is “[t]o mƗlama (protect)
Hawai‘i’s people and environmental resources and OHA’s assets, toward ensuring the
perpetuation of the culture, the enhancement of lifestyle and the protection of entitlements of
Native Hawaiians, while enabling the building of a strong and healthy Hawaiian people and
nation, recognized nationally and internationally.” OHA Vision and Mission, OFFICE OF
HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.oha.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategor
y&id=23&Itemid=127 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). The Hawai‘i Constitution limited the right
to vote for the nine OHA trustees to “qualified voters who are Hawaiians, as provided by
law.” HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5. The term “Hawaiian” as provided by statute means “any
descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which exercised
sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have
continued to reside in Hawai[‘]i.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (2009). This limitation was
challenged and set aside in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517, 524 (2000); see infra Part
III.A.1. For a more detailed review of the Rice case, see Eric Yamamoto & Catherine Betts,
Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice
v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 541 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008).
16. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (affirming the State’s “obligation to protect, control
and regulate the use of Hawai[‘]i’s water resources for the benefit of its people”); id. art. XII,
§ 7 (declaring that the “State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and
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In particular, OHA and the Hui focused on the commission’s
directive to “protect, enhance, and reestablish, where practicable,
beneficial instream uses of water,” to give meaning to traditional and
17
customary KƗnaka Maoli rights and environmental protection. More
specifically, the groups relied upon constitutional and statutory
provisions establishing the state’s duty to “reaffirm[] and . . . protect all
rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural
and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua‘a tenants who are
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands
18
prior to 1778.” The Hawai‘i Water Code’s pledge that traditional and
19
customary rights “shall not be abridged or denied by this chapter” also

traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by
ahupua‘a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian
Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights”); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 174C-101 (1993); Closing Brief of Hui o NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ and Maui Tomorrow
Foundation, Inc., ‘Ʈao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use
Permit Applications and Petition to Amend Interim Instream Flow Standards of Waihe’e,
Waiehu, ‘Ʈao, & Waikapǌ Streams Contested Case Hearing (Contested Case Hearing), No.
CCH-MA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Hui’s Closing Brief]; Eric K. Yamamoto & Sara
D. Ayabe, Courts in the “Age of Reconciliation”: Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. HCDCH, 33
U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 24–27) (on file with author) (describing
the State’s commitment to reconciliation with and restorative justice for KƗnaka Maoli,
rooted in the constitution, statutes, and court rulings to redress the harms to Maoli over the
last century).
17. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(4). “Instream use” means “beneficial uses of stream
water for significant purposes which are located in the stream and which are achieved by
leaving the water in the stream.” Id. § 174C-3. Instream uses include, but are not limited to,
(1) Maintenance of fish and wildlife habitats; (2) Outdoor recreational activities;
(3) Maintenance of ecosystems such as estuaries, wetlands, and stream vegetation;
(4) Aesthetic values such as waterfalls and scenic waterways; (5) Navigation;
(6) Instream hydropower generation; (7) Maintenance of water quality; (8) The
conveyance of irrigation and domestic water supplies to downstream points of
diversion; and (9) The protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights.
Id. Maoli traditional and customary rights reliant upon fresh water resources include, but are
not limited to, “the cultivation or propagation of taro on one’s own kuleana and the gathering
of h[Ư]h[Ư]wai, [‘ǀ]pae, [‘]o‘opu, limu, thatch, ti leaf, aho cord, and medicinal plants for
subsistence, cultural, and religious purposes.” Id. § 174C-101(c).
18. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2010); id. § 174C-101(c)
(1993). An “ahupua‘a” is a “land division usually extending from the uplands to the sea, so
called because the boundary was marked by a heap (ahu) of stones surmounted by an image
of a pig (pua‘a), or because a pig or other tribute was laid on the altar as tax to the chief.”
HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 9.
19. HAW REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c) (1993) (protecting and delineating some traditional
and customary Maoli rights regarding fresh water resources); Yamamoto & Ayabe, supra
note 16, at 16–17.
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figured prominently in the case.
Through protracted litigation, the Hui and its allies established that
restoring water to each of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s streams and communities was
not merely a constitutional and statutory mandate, but also a necessity
20
in light of restorative justice principles. The hearings officer, in his
April 2009 Proposed Decision and Order, agreed with the Hui and
OHA that stream restoration was “critical to the perpetuation and
21
practice of Hawaiian culture in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ.” He also relied upon the
specific history of agricultural and spiritual practices in this area in
rendering his proposed decision: “In particular, cold, free-flowing water
is essential for kalo cultivation, which in turn is integral to the wellbeing, sustenance, and cultural and religious practices of native
22
The hearings officer, the most
Hawaiians and Hawaiians.”
experienced water commissioner and former director of the State
Department of Health, understood that “[k]alo cultivation provides not
only a source of food, but also spiritual sustenance, promotes
community awareness and a connection to the land, and supports
23
physical fitness and mental well-being.” With these and other findings
and in light of the applicable legal language, the hearings officer’s
Proposed Decision and Order recommended restoring about half the
20. See, e.g., Hearings Officer’s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decision and Order at 11–12, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (Apr. 9, 2009)
[hereinafter Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O], available at http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm
/currentissues/cchma0601/CCHMA0601-01.pdf; NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ: Restoring Maui’s Famous
Streams, supra note 10; Restore Stream Flow, supra note 9. Restorative justice is grounded in
notions of “social healing through justice.” Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations
Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 41 (2007).
21. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 12.
22. Id.; see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1332 n.2 (discussing the use of specific terms,
such as “Black,” that can be used as proper nouns to refer to a heritage or cultural group and
not just people of a particular skin pigmentation). One KƗnaka Maoli creation story explains
that Papa and WƗkea, the Earthmother and Skyfather, came together and gave birth to most
of the major Hawaiian Islands. ROY KƖKULU ALAMEIDA, STORIES OF OLD HAWAII 1
(1997). WƗkea then had a child with Ho‘ohǀkǌkalani, but it was stillborn. HANDY &
HANDY, supra note 2, at 80. Where they buried that child, a kalo plant grew. Id. The food
that kalo produced became the staple for KƗnaka Maoli, providing both physical and spiritual
sustenance. Id. WƗkea and Ho‘ohǀkǌkalani’s second child was the first Native born in
Hawai‘i. Id.
23. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 12. For background on the
education and experience of the hearings officer, Dr. Miike, including information about his
medical and law degrees, and scholarship regarding Hawai‘i water issues, see About the
Author, in LAWRENCE MIIKE, WATER AND THE LAW IN HAWAI‘I (2004), and Dissenting
Opinion of the Hearings Officer and Commissioner Lawrence H. Miike at 3–6, Contested
Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (June 10, 2010) [hereinafter Hearings Officer’s Dissent].
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diverted flows to NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s four streams and communities. 24
Despite extensive findings regarding the negative impacts of over a
century of stream diversions on Maoli culture and people and the
importance of restoration, in June 2010, a majority of the water
commission, while ostensibly applying the “law,” overturned the
proposed decision, restoring only 12.5 million gallons per day (mgd) to
25
two of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s four streams in its Final Decision and Order.
Rather than follow the hearings officer’s lead and consider the history of
Indigenous practices unique to this area, in the face of intense political
pressure, the commission majority employed a-contextual analysis to
interpret the same laws and evidence but arrived at a drastically
26
That final decision undermined KƗnaka Maoli
different outcome.
cultural survival, perpetuated the subjugation of ancestral rights and
resources, and prolonged dismal social welfare conditions caused by the
plantation’s misappropriation of free-flowing streams for over a
27
The commission’s decision also subverted the value
century.
accommodation crafted by the laws’ framers as a reflection of the larger
society’s balancing of the needs of the general populace, business
interests, and KƗnaka Maoli.
The majority’s ultimate decision was an apparent response to
28
In this setting, comparing the
explicit lobbying by agribusiness.
proposed and final decisions provides valuable insight into the influence
24. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 18789. In his Proposed
Decision and Order, the hearings officer recommended that the water commission amend the
IIFSs above the uppermost diversions to restore a total of 34.5 mgd to NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s streams
and communities. Id. The hearings officer would have restored a minimum flow of 14 mgd to
Waihe‘e, 2.2 mgd to North Waiehu and 1.3 mgd to South Waiehu, 13 mgd to ‘Ʈao, and a
temporary release of 4 mgd to Waikapǌ. Id.; Teresa Dawson, Hearing Officer Issues
Recommendations for Na Wai ‘Eha Contested Case Hearing, ENVIRONMENT HAWAI‘I
(Environment
Hawaii,
Hilo,
Haw.),
June
2009,
at
2,
available
at
http://hawaiis1000friends.org/nmwa/docs/maui_county/200906_EH_NaWaiEha.pdf.
25. Compare Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 187–89, with
Commission on Water Resource Management’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decision and Order at 185–87, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (June 10, 2010)
[hereinafter Final D&O], available at http://www.state.hi.us/dlnr/cwrm/currentissues/cchma06
01/CCHMA0601-02.pdf. The majority ordered 10 mgd for Waihe‘e River, 1.6 mgd for North
Waiehu, and 0.9 mgd for South Waiehu. Id. at 18586. The majority decided not to restore
any water to ‘Ʈao or Waikapǌ Streams. Id. at 18687.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See Teresa Dawson, Parties Conclude Debate over Impacts of Stream Restoration in
Central Maui, ENV’T HAWAI‘I (Environment Hawaii, Hilo, Haw.), Nov. 2009, at 3–4; see also
infra Part V.B.
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of politics on adjudicatory decision-making, especially in controversial
29
Led by
and politically charged environmental cases like this one.
former Chair Laura Thielen, the water commission majority
dramatically altered the hearings officer’s outcome and reinterpreted
the law to favor agribusiness—particularly Hawaiian Commercial and
30
31
Sugar Company (HC&S). A-contextual—that is, formalist —analysis
of relevant legal mandates, including how much water was necessary to
return to the streams after “weigh[ing] the importance of the present or
potential instream values with the importance of the present or potential
32
uses of water for noninstream purposes” and determining what
33
alternative water sources were “practicable” for offstream users like
HC&S, enabled the majority to focus on present commercial uses and to
largely ignore or dismiss crucial Maoli cultural and historical facets of
the controversy. It also allowed the majority to disregard the impacts of
its decision on present-day Maoli efforts to reclaim land, resurrect
culture, and restore natural resources essential to traditional practices,
subverting a myriad of contextual factors that are embodied in Hawai‘i
water law. The commission majority, therefore, claimed that it
“followed the mandates of the law as described in the Constitution, state

29. For example, HC&S—one of the largest companies in Hawai‘i—uses the lion’s share
of the diverted water and repeatedly threatened to close all operations if the Commission did
not award it the bulk of the water it was taking. See, e.g., Chris Hamilton, Na Wai Eha:
HC&S Speaks, MAUI NEWS (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.mauinews.com/page/content.detail/id/
524576/Na-Wai-Eha—HC-S-speaks.html (explaining how HC&S workers and executives
questioned the basis for the proposed decision).
30. See, e.g., Teresa Dawson, Commission’s Order on Na Wai ‘Eha Baffles Its Most
Experienced Member, ENVIRONMENT HAWAI‘I (Environment Hawai‘i, Hilo, Haw.), July
2010, at 1, available at http://www.maui-tomorrow.org/pdf/EH_201007.pdf. (“After all the
evidence and expert testimony presented during the Na Wai ‘Eha contested-case hearings in
2007 and 2008 on the minimum flows necessary to protect stream habitats and other instream
values, which numbers did the state Commission on Water Resource Management finally go
with? The ones that were never intended to be used for that purpose . . . .”).
31. See infra Part III.A.1; see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–
REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 2 (2009). Legal formalism is a
“theory of adjudication according to which ‘(1) the law is rationally determinate, and (2)
judging is mechanical. It follows, moreover, from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is autonomous,
since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique outcome; no recourse to non-legal
reasons is demanded or required.’” Id. (quoting Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism,
Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1145–46 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)).
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D) (1993).
33. In re Water Use Permit Applications (WaiƗhole II), 93 P.3d 643, 661 (Haw. 2004); see
also Final D&O, supra note 25, at 116.
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statutes and the Hawai‘i Supreme Court decisions.” 34 The majority also
maintained that “[a]t the end of the deliberative process,
[c]ommissioners reached agreement on instream flow standards which
the majority felt represented the best balance of the [legally] mandated
35
values and trust responsibilities” even though its decision disserved
restorative justice principles and continued the subjugation of KƗnaka
Maoli communities and culture.
Contextual legal analysis, discussed below, tells a starkly different
story about the commission’s final decision. It reveals the impact of
politics on “legal interpretation” and “fact finding” in controversial
cases. It demonstrates also that the majority’s ruling is impossible to
reconcile with the underlying values of Hawai‘i’s Constitution and
Water Code, which prioritize public trust purposes, including the
protection and restoration of natural resources and Indigenous rights
36
Contextual legal analysis starts with the premise
and practices.
(verified by socio-legal studies) that even though decision-makers may
feel constrained to follow the legal rules to appear legitimate, they do
not actually do so in a “neutral” or “objective” manner, especially in
controversial cases. Contextual analysis then focuses on the actual
dynamics of decision-making, paying special attention to the value
choices and interests implicated in adjudicatory decisions. This analysis
exposes a crucial tension in complex cases like NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ: decisional
outcomes according to legal language are not “objectively determined”
but are instead a matter of value choices influenced by decision-makers’
34. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 191.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c) (1993) (“Traditional and customary rights
of ahupua‘a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian
Islands prior to 1778 shall not be abridged or denied by this chapter.”); id. § 174C-63
(“Appurtenant rights are preserved. Nothing in this part shall be construed to deny the
exercise of an appurtenant right by the holder thereof at any time. A permit for water use
based on an existing appurtenant right shall be issued upon application.”). Appurtenant
rights appertain or attach to parcels of land that were cultivated, usually in the traditional
staple kalo, at the time of the MƗhele when private property was instituted in Hawai‘i. See
Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 78 (Haw. 1982). MƗhele land awards to
maka‘Ɨinana (people of the land or “commoners”) are called kuleana (to have an interest).
LILIKALƖ KAME‘ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONO AI?
HOW SHALL WE LIVE IN HARMONY? 295 (1992). The Land Commission received claims
from maka‘Ɨinana over a period of several years prior to the 1848 MƗhele. Id. Claimants did
not have to pay a commutation fee (except for lots in Honolulu, LƗhainƗ, and Hilo), but did
have to pay for the survey of their kuleana lands. Id. At the end of the MƗhele process,
kuleana awards totaled 28,658 acres of land (less than one percent of the total acreage of land
in Hawai‘i). Id.
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political and economic ideologies in construing legal terms, selecting
“relevant” facts, and assessing impacts.
Having lifted the veil of necessarily neutral legal decision-making,
how can KƗnaka Maoli, the government, the courts, and the community
37
at large realistically assess these Indigenous environmental justice
claims and the water commission’s adjudicatory ruling? Might these
assessments illuminate justice, or injustice, for Native Peoples generally?
Most important, how might contextual legal analysis contribute to
envisioning and realizing “justice through law,” particularly for
Indigenous Peoples struggling to rebuild culture, spirituality, and some
form of self-governance?
By interrogating the water commission’s decision-making in NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ, this article offers a developing contextual legal framework
38
applicable to Native Peoples’ claims and adjudicatory rulings. It does
so not by conceptualizing the legal process as the inevitable march
toward justice, but rather by acknowledging that law, as it intersects
with politics, can be both subordinating and, at times, an opening toward
39
restoration and self-determination.
Part II.A examines water’s cultural and historical significance in
Hawai‘i nei (this beloved Hawai‘i) and how that was impacted by the
rise of sugar plantations. Part II.B delves into the role of abundant fresh
40
water and mauka to makai flow in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, and analyzes the sugar
plantations’ negative impacts on Indigenous culture and identity,
especially in the context of water appropriation.
Part II.C reviews the legal regime for water resource management in
Hawai‘i, which embodies contextual factors. Although ultimately
expressed in somewhat general terms, these values safeguard the public
trust nature of Hawai‘i’s water resources while prioritizing certain
purposes, including resource protection and Maoli rights and practices.
These factors recognize and attempt to redress the harms of

37. In the context of this Article, environmental justice means “fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies.” Kristina G. Fisher, The Rhino in the Colonia: How Colonias
Development Council v. Rhino Environmental Services, Inc. Set a Substantive State Standard
for Environmental Justice, 39 ENVTL. L. 397, 422 (2009) (quoting N.M. ADMIN. CODE
§ 20.9.2.7(E)(2)).
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See Sproat, Water, supra note 14, at 188 (defining mauka to makai flow).
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colonization, and stream diversions in particular, on both KƗnaka Maoli
and the community at large by mandating the protection and restoration
of streams and the uses they support. Part II.C also explains the process
for establishing Interim Instream Flow Standards (IIFSs), the key legal
tool employed by the Hui and its allies to restore NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ streams
and communities.
Part III approaches Indigenous Peoples’ claims and relevant court
rulings through different lenses including legal formalism, legal realism,
critical legal analysis, and critical race theory.
Part IV flows from legal realism’s critique of formalism and the
insights of critical race theory, particularly its revelation regarding the
indeterminacy of rules, with an acknowledgement of limitations. Part
IV describes a developing contextual legal framework for environmental
justice claims that accounts for two adjudicatory realities: (1) decisionmakers feel constrained by concerns of legitimacy to try to follow legal
rules; and (2) in controversial cases, decision-makers are also influenced
by political ideology and economic interests in construing and applying
the relevant legal language. Contextual legal analysis brings to light
these realities to make decision-making more compellingly reflect
principles of equality and fairness within a larger framework of social
41
justice.
This contextual legal analysis, while revealing, is itself incomplete for
Indigenous Peoples, particularly where specific lawssuch as Hawai‘i’s
Water Code—accommodate their interests and values. The analysis
requires extension and refinement to more explicitly account for key
aspects of Native Peoples’ struggles for self-determination through
42
Tailoring this framework
varying forms of environmental justice.
entails attention to four realms: (1) cultural integrity; (2) lands and other
natural resources; (3) social welfare and development; and (4) selfgovernment. These realms provide a starting point for analysis by
synthesizing international human rights notions of self-determination
43
for formerly colonized peoples. The proffered analysis thus addresses
41. See Courtenay W. Daum & Eric Ishiwata, From the Myth of Formal Equality to the
Politics of Social Justice: Race and the Legal Attack on Native Entitlements, 44 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 843, 866–67 (2010) (defining social justice as “a strategic alternative to formal equality”
that “allows for those communities that have been historically oppressed to place claims on
the political and legal systems to overcome a legacy of discrimination and institutionalized
racism”).
42. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
43. See infra Parts IV.C–D.
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a wide range of legal controversies involving Native Peoples’
environmental values and claims
Part V employs this analysis, revealing that the commission
majority’s final decision in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, while embracing formalist
methodology, is not actually “grounded in the facts or law,” thereby
undermining restorative justice for KƗnaka Maoli and larger community
interests. This contextual legal analysis also underscores the importance
of an adjudicatory body giving full consideration to land, culture, social
welfare, and self-governance in assessing Indigenous Peoples’
environmental claims to restorative justice—particularly claims rooted
in legal directives to “reaffirm[] and . . . protect all rights, customarily
and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious
44
At bottom, contextual legal analysis highlights the
purposes.”
uncertain yet potentially potent opening for the legal process, when
appropriately linked to political organizing and other change agents, to
create opportunities for liberation and justice—first at the
45
administrative adjudication level and later in courts of law. In doing
so, the analysis brings an expanded kind of realism to issues of
environmental justice for Indigenous Peoples.
The water commission’s final ruling is already percolating up
through the courts of appeal and is currently pending before the Hawai‘i
46
Supreme Court. Prophesying how the high court will likely rule is
risky business, particularly in light of the multifaceted nature of the
evidence marshaled and the legal arguments advanced. By specifically
considering history and current socio-economic conditions in the context
of cultural integrity, lands and other resources, social welfare, and selfgovernance, contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims offers
courts a compelling analytical method for assessing cases involving
47
Native Peoples’ claims for justice. This framework also reveals the
necessity of employing contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’

44. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
45. See infra Part V.
46. On July 12, 2010, the Hui and OHA appealed the water commission’s June 2010
Final Decision and Order to Hawai‘i’s Intermediate Court of Appeals. See Community
(July
13, 2010),
Groups
Appeal
Na
Wai
Eha
Ruling,
MAUI NEWS
http://www.mauinews.com/page/content.detail/id/533350.html.
The appeal was recently
transferred to the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, upon the Hui’s motion, where briefing is ongoing.
See Order Accepting Application for Transfer, Appeal from the Commission on Water
Resource Management, Contested Case Hearing, No. SCAP-3063 (Haw. June 23, 2011).
47. See infra Part V.
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claims because, as demonstrated here, even when the law itself
embodies broader interests and values, formalist methodology can still
be deployed to subvert both full and proper consideration of those
interests and values and the possibility of “justice through law.”
II. HISTORICAL SETTING AND THE LITIGATION
A. Fresh Water’s Historical and Cultural Significance in Hawai‘i Nei
Before Westerners stumbled onto Hawai‘i’s shores in the late 1700s,
48
fresh water was a principal source of life in the islands. Streams and
springs supplied drinking water for substantial populations of KƗnaka
49
Maoli, sustained healthy ecosystems that linked mountain flows to
nearshore marine waters, enabled abundant estuaries and fisheries in
the streams and oceans, and supported Native agriculture and
aquaculture, including lo‘i kalo—the wetland cultivation of kalo that
was made into the Native staple poi—and loko i‘a—traditional
50
fishponds. Ola i ka wai: fresh water was the source of all life for

48. D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, From Wai to KƗnƗwai: Water Law in Hawai‘i, in NATIVE
HAWAIIAN LAW: SECOND EDITION OF THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 9-1, 93 (MacKenzie, Serrano, & Sproat eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Sproat, From
Wai to KƗnƗwai]; see also HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 64 (detailing the importance of
fresh water to the Native Hawaiian people); Emma Metcalf Nakuina, Ancient Hawaiian
Water Rights: And Some of the Customs Pertaining to Them, in HAWAIIAN ALMANAC &
ANNUAL FOR 1894, at 79, 79–84 (Thomas G. Thrum ed., 1893) (describing KƗnaka Maoli
customs associated with fresh water). For an analysis of the arrival of Westerners in Hawai‘i
and resulting impacts, see KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36, at 67.
49. See generally DAVID E. STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF
HAWAI‘I ON THE EVE OF WESTERN CONTACT 78–80 (1989) (providing detailed population
estimates of KƗnaka Maoli at the time of Western contact); KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36,
at 81 (explaining that Stannard’s conservative methodologies underestimate the number of
people inhabiting Hawai‘i at the time of Western contact and a figure of “at least one million
Hawaiians in 1778” is more appropriate); ROBERT C. SCHMITT, DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS
OF HAWAII: 1778–1965, at 36–38 (1968) (discussing the decline of Hawai‘i’s Indigenous
population in the nineteenth century).
50. Sproat, From Wai to KƗnƗwai, supra note 48, at 9-3 to 9-5. Lo‘i kalo refers to the
wetland cultivation of the staple crop kalo (taro, or Colocasia esculenta), which was
traditionally raised in irrigated paddies. See generally JOSEPH M. FARBER, ANCIENT
HAWAIIAN FISHPONDS: CAN RESTORATION SUCCEED ON MOLOKA‘I? 68 (2d ed. 2001)
(analyzing the significance of loko i‘a and current restoration efforts); HANDY & HANDY,
supra note 2, at 71118 (detailing the practices and culture of kalo cultivation in ancient
Hawai‘i, including the role of kalo and poi in Maoli society); HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra
note 1, at 209 (defining lo‘i); Wayne Tanaka, Loko i‘a—Hawaiian Fishponds, in NATIVE
HAWAIIAN LAW, supra note 48, at 11-2 to 11-8 (detailing the history and cultural significance
of loko i‘a in ancient Hawai‘i).
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Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People. 51 In fact, fresh water was so important
that it was revered as a kinolau, or the physical embodiment of KƗne,
52
one of the four principal akua of the Maoli pantheon. Given fresh
water’s significance to Indigenous communities and culture, it was
shared by all and managed as a public trust resource for the benefit of
53
present and future generations.
Water’s vital role in Maoli society is better understood when
considering the interconnection of significant terms. In ‘ƿlelo Hawai‘i,
54
the islands’ Native language, the word for fresh water is wai. Waiwai,
55
or water repeated twice, means valuables or wealth. The term for law
is kƗnƗwai, because Hawai‘i’s early laws evolved around the
56
management and use of fresh water. Given that wai, or water, is at the
heart of each of these concepts, it is no coincidence that both wealth and
the law were and continue to be defined by access to and appropriate
57
management of Hawai‘i’s fresh water.
Not long after the arrival of foreigners, Hawai‘i became a magnet for

51. D. KAPUA‘ALA SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI: A LEGAL PRIMER FOR WATER USE AND
MANAGEMENT IN HAWAI‘I 35 (2009) [hereinafter SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI] (detailing the
role that fresh water played in pre-European contact Hawai‘i and why it was a foundation for
life in the islands).
52. HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 65; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text
(discussing Akua KƗne’s significance).
53. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Haw. 1973) (holding that “the
right to water is one of the most important usufruct of lands, and it appears clear . . . [that] the
right to water was specifically and definitely reserved for the people of Hawai[‘]i for the
common good in all of the land grants”); Sproat, From Wai to KƗnƗwai, supra note 48, at 9-5;
see also HAW. CONST. of 1840, translated in TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, ESTABLISHED IN THE REIGN OF KAMEHAMEHA III 10–
11 (photo. reprint 1994) (1842) (acknowledging the public trust nature of Hawai‘i’s water
resources); HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 6364 (conceptualizing water as a public trust
resource); KA LAMA Kǋ O KA NO‘EAU: THE STANDING TORCH OF WISDOM vi-vii (2009)
(discussing how William S. Richardson, the former chief justice of the Hawai‘i Supreme
Court, helped to reincorporate Native Hawaiian tradition and custom into state law).
54. HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 377. For a more in-depth discussion of
the range of terms associated with fresh water, see HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 5758.
55. HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 380.
56. Id. at 127–28; see also LORRIN ANDREWS, A DICTIONARY OF THE HAWAIIAN
LANGUAGE 257 (2003) (“The ancient system of regulations for water courses contained
almost everything the ancient Hawaiians formerly had in common in the shape of laws; hence
the name Kanawai has in more modern times been given to laws in general.”); HANDY &
HANDY, supra note 2, at 58 (“The word kanawai, or law, also tied back to water. Ka-na-wai
is literally ‘belonging-to-the-waters.’”).
57. See HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 5758.
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plantation agriculture, including the cultivation of sugar cane.58
Hawai‘i’s favorable climate and year-round growing season were perfect
59
for cane; all the sugar barons needed was water to irrigate their fields.
On Maui, like the other Hawaiian islands, miles of extensive ditch
systems were constructed to capture free-flowing streams for the sugar
60
planters’ benefit. Contrary to Native traditions and laws, newcomers
61
to the islands viewed water as a commodity for private use. They gave
little thought to the cultural harms that resulted from taking the entire
flow of streams and depriving natural and human communities of this
62
physical and spiritual life force.
Despite Maoli laws and customs that managed water as a public
trust, plantations increasingly diverted streams and springs for their
63
Conflicts over fresh-water resources erupted, first
private use.
between plantation interests and KƗnaka Maoli and later between

58. The history of plantations in Hawai‘i is difficult and complex. For more information
regarding Hawai‘i’s plantation history, see NOEL KENT, HAWAII ISLANDS UNDER THE
INFLUENCE 35–55 (2d ed. 1993).
See generally HANAHANA: AN ORAL HISTORY
ANTHOLOGY OF HAWAII’S WORKING PEOPLE (Michi Kodama-Nishimoto et al. eds., 1984)
(featuring oral history narratives of twelve laborers and how they felt working on the sugar
plantations in the twentieth century); RONALD TAKAKI, PAU HANA: PLANTATION LIFE AND
LABOR IN HAWAII 1835–1920, at 321 (1983) (describing the impact of plantation owners on
Maoli); TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1518; CAROL WILCOX, SUGAR WATER:
HAWAII’S PLANTATION DITCHES 9–11 (1996) (detailing Hawai‘i’s plantation history of water
appropriation).
59. WILCOX, supra note 58, at 12; D. Kapua‘ala Sproat & Isaac H. Moriwake, Ke Kalo
Pa‘a o WaiƗhole: Use of the Public Trust as a Tool for Environmental Advocacy, in CREATIVE
COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 247, 25153 (Clifford
Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini eds., 2007).
60. See, e.g., WILCOX, supra note 58, at 11437; Sproat, From Wai to KƗnƗwai, supra
note 48, at 9-8 to 9-10. For more specific information on the various ditches and distribution
systems on Maui, see Final D&O, supra note 25, at 2532.
61. Sproat, From Wai to KƗnƗwai, supra note 48, at 9-6 to 9-10.
62. See, e.g., WILCOX, supra note 58, at 9–11 (acknowledging that “[o]ne can admire the
vision and initiative of the early sugar planters while at the same time mourning the loss of
water resources and authentic Hawaiian lifestyle”); TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1518
(chronicling the impacts of sugar plantation diversions in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ on KƗnaka Maoli and
their culture); Elizabeth Ann Ho‘oipo KƗla‘ena‘auao Pa Martin et al., Cultures in Conflict in
Hawai‘i: The Law and Politics of Native Hawaiian Water Rights, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 71, 95
(1996) (explaining that sugar plantations withdrew “unlimited quantities of water regardless
of the consequences to the environment and other water users,” ignoring “the basic precept
that Hawaiians’ traditional life support systems depended upon the integrity of ma[u]kamakai (mountain to sea) resources”).
63. See TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1518 (detailing the history of plantation
owners taking public trust water without consulting Maoli communities).
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competing plantations. 64 In fact, some of the Hawai‘i Reporter’s earliest
published decisions on water rights involved disputes over flows taken
65
from NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ streams. Court decisions under both the Kingdom
of Hawai‘i and later the Territory of Hawai‘i began to reflect
increasingly Western notions of private property, and soon both the
physical resource and the law of water in Hawai‘i were appropriated to
66
suit plantation needs.
After about a century of plantation rule, a movement resurfaced in
the 1960s and 1970s to return public resources to public management
67
and control. As detailed in Part II.C, below, this created the regime
68
for water resource management in Hawai‘i today.

64. See, e.g., Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 377 (1930); Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar
Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 14 Haw. 50, 52 (1902); Horner v. Kumuliilii, 10 Haw. 174, 175
(1895).
65. See Lonoaea v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 9 Haw. 651, 652–53 (1895); Peck v. Bailey, 8
Haw. 658, 659–62, 673–74 (1867) (denying sugar company’s claim to paramount rights to
water in the Wailuku (or ‘Ʈao) Stream, holding that both parties were limited to their
appurtenant rights to use water for their lands, neither party having exceptional rights and
further holding that the defendant had the right to use taro water); WILCOX, supra note 58, at
33 (explaining that “from 1900 to 1959, the Hawai[‘]i Supreme Court was composed of
lawyers drawn from the prominent business interests whose commercial philosophy they
upheld”).
66. D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water: The Moon Court’s Role in
Illuminating Hawai‘i Water Law, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 7–8)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water]; see also SPROAT,
OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 6.
67. Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water, supra note 66, at 89.
68. Id. at 9; see also KA LAMA Kǋ O KA NO‘EAU, supra note 53, at vi–vii.
Hawai‘i has a unique legal system, a system of laws that was originally built on an
ancient and traditional culture. While that ancient culture had largely been
displaced, nevertheless many of the underlying guiding principles remained. During
the years after the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893 and through
Hawai‘i’s territorial period, the decisions of our highest court, reflected a primarily
Western orientation and sensibility that wasn’t a comfortable fit with Hawai‘i’s
indigenous people and its immigrant population. We set about returning control of
interpreting the law to those with deep roots in and profound love for Hawai‘i. The
result can be found in the decisions of our Supreme Court beginning after
statehood. Thus, we made a conscious effort to look to Hawaiian custom and
tradition . . .—and consistent with Hawaiian practice, our court held that beaches
were free to all, that access to the mountains and shoreline must be provided to the
people, and that water resources could not be privately owned.
Id. (quoting Chief Justice William S. Richardson).
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B. Fresh Water’s Historical and Cultural Significance in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ
As detailed in Part I, above, NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ was “famed in song and
69
Even the water commission majority recognized that the
story.”
abundance of natural and cultural resources, especially fresh water,
made NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ “the primary ritual, political, and population center
70
of Maui.” “Due to the profusion of fresh-flowing water in ancient
times, NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ supported one of the largest populations and was
considered the most abundant area on Maui; it also figured centrally in
71
Moreover, “[t]he four
Hawaiian history and culture in general.”
ahupua‘a of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ and their streams comprised the largest
continuous area of wetland taro cultivation in [all of] the [Hawaiian]
72
[I]slands.” “NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ was a prime location not only for fertile kalo
lands that helped sustain Hawaiian culture for over 1,000 years, but also
the creation of a complex irrigation system that the Hawaiian people
73
The
properly managed and used to support robust communities.”
abundant fresh water in this region thus physically and spiritually
nurtured its Indigenous People, enriching lands and other resources,
promoting a vibrant culture, enhancing the overall quality of life, and
74
enabling political independence and cultural sovereignty.
These natural riches also attracted sugar barons who diverted NƗ
75
Wai ‘EhƗ’s fresh water for their commercial use. Beginning in 1862,
sugar interests began to construct and use ditches to take stream flows
76
for plantation irrigation in the area. “Historically, an average of about
69. HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 272; see also supra note 5.
70. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
71. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 8.
72. Id. For a definition of ahupua‘a see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
73. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.
74. “Cultural sovereignty” is the effort of Native Peoples to “exercise their own norms
and values in structuring their collective futures.” Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit of
Racial Healing Within Critical Race Theory: An Exercise in Transformative Thought, 11
MICH. J. RACE & L. 21, 45 (2005) (quotations omitted) (quoting Wallace Coffey & Rebecca
Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective
Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191, 196 (2001)).
75. See generally TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1518.
76. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 27. Construction on the companies’ current surface
water systemsthe Spreckels, ‘Ʈao and Waiehu, and Waihe’e ditch systems—began in 1882,
1900, and 1905, respectively, and built on and expanded the companies’ initial irrigation
systems. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 23, at 160. Today, “[t]he primary
distribution systems receive stream waters via nine active diversions, two on Waihe‘e River,
one on North Waiehu Stream, one of South Waiehu Stream, two on ‘Ʈao Stream and three on
Waikapǌ Stream.” Final D&O, supra note 25, at 26. In addition there are a number of

12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

144

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 12:41 PM

[95:127

67 mgd was diverted from the four streams for sugar cane irrigation: 40
mgd from Waihe‘e, 3 mgd from North Waiehu, 3 mgd from South
Waiehu, 18 mgd from ‘Ʈao, and 3 mgd from Waikapǌ,” leaving the
77
streams bone-dry below the ditch intakes. These diversions took the
lion’s share of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s fresh water with significant, negative
impacts on KƗnaka Maoli resources, cultural integrity, social welfare
conditions, and self-governance. Unfortunately, “Native Hawaiian
communities and agricultural systems felt the burden of the plantations
almost immediately, and the rise of sugar initiated a period of great
78
transformation in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ and in Hawai‘i.” As one example, on
January 13, 1866, S.D. Haku‘ole chronicled the effects of the sugar
plantations in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ via the Hawaiian language newspaper
Nǌpepa Kǌ‘oko‘a:
DESPAIR! WAILUKU IS BEING DESTROYED BY THE
SUGAR PLANTATION—A letter by S.D. Haku‘ole, of Kula,
Maui arrived at our office, he was declaring that the land of
Wailuku is being lost due to the cultivation of sugarcane.
Furthermore, he states the current condition of once cultivated
taro patches being dried up by the foreigners, where they are
now planting sugarcane. Also, he fears that Hawaiians of that
place will no longer be able to eat poi, and that there will
probably only be hard crackers which hurt the teeth when eaten,
a cracker to snack on but does not satisfy the hunger of the
Hawaiian people. Although, let it be known that the Hawaiian
79
people were accustomed to eating poi.

“kuleana” intakes directly on the streams, which historically provided water to KƗnaka Maoli
for household and other uses, including the cultivation of kalo. Id.
77. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 32.
78. TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.
79. Id. at 16 (quoting S.D. Haku‘ole, Despair! Wailuku Is Being Destroyed by The Sugar
Plantation, NǋPEPA Kǋ‘OKO‘A, Jan. 13, 1866).
The words of Haku‘ole remind us that Native Hawaiian culture is intimately tied to
the land and the water, and the inability to access these resources threatens the life
of a people. Yet it is also here that one might find hope, for in the water is life, and
the return of the streams will promote a vigorous and healthy regeneration of land
and people.
Id. at 18; see also HANDY & HANDY, supra note 2, at 71115 (detailing the practices and
culture of kalo cultivation in ancient Hawai‘i, including the role of kalo and poi in KƗnaka
Maoli society); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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Over a century later, those impacts continue: “Cultural experts and
community witnesses provided uncontroverted testimony regarding
limitations on Native Hawaiians’ ability to exercise traditional and
customary rights and practices in the greater NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ area due to
the lack of fresh water flowing in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s streams and into the
80
nearshore marine waters.”
For over 150 years, sugar plantations arose, merged, and closed in
NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, although the principal plantation interests remained
Wailuku Sugar Company (which later became Wailuku Agribusiness
81
82
and is now Wailuku Water Company (WWC)) and HC&S. Despite
many changes, including significant reductions in the amount of land in
cane cultivation, plantation diversions on NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ streams continue
apace, maintaining the subordination of Maoli people, culture, and
83
resources.
C. Hawai‘i’s Legal Regime for Water Resource Management
In light of Hawai’i’s unique history (including the United States’ role
in the illegal overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian Kingdom in 1893),
issues impacting KƗnaka Maoli implicate restorative justice principles
that underscore the importance of respecting Indigenous rights in partial
84
redress for the harms of American colonialism. Justice for Hawai‘i’s

80. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 10; see also TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1519
(noting the negative effects of plantation irrigation systems on KƗnaka Maoli).
81. Background on NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/
features/background-on-na-wai-eha (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (“Wailuku Sugar Company
has reinvented itself as Wailuku Water Company. It maintains its water diversions to turn a
profit by selling that water to the private development projects built on the former plantation
lands.”).
82. HC&S is a subsidiary of Alexander & Baldwin (A&B) and the major user of NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ water to irrigate about 5,000 acres of its 36,000-acre plantation. Koa Kaulukukui, Maui:
In Water We Trust, THE HAWAII INDEPENDENT (June 16, 2011) (on file with law review).
HC&S’s plantation consists of sugar cane, although it leases some land to Monsato, an
agricultural biotechnology corporation, to grow seed corn. Id. “Historically, HC&S
supplemented the stream water systems with 16 wells tapping underground water beneath its
plantation with the capacity to pump over 240 million gallons per day.” Id. A&B is the last
of the “Big Five” companies—the original five plantations started by colonistsstill
dominant in Hawai‘i’s economy. Allison Schaefers, Among the Big 5, A&B Still Reigns,
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN (Oct. 22, 2009), http://archives.starbulletin.com/content/
20091025_among_the_big_5_ab_still_reigns.
83. See Background on Na Wai ‘EhƗ, supra note 81; Four Waters of Maui Removed
From Private Control, ENV’T NEWS SERV. (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.ensnewswire.com/ens/mar2008/2008-03-21-091.html.
84. Pub. L. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) [hereinafter Apology Resolution] (“Joint
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Indigenous People, however, also benefits all of Hawai‘i’s people, many
85
of whom are not “Hawaiian” by ethnicity or nationality.
As described below, Hawai‘i currently has a detailed legal regime for
the management of fresh water, including constitutional provisions,
statutes, and other legal tools that have the potential to yield just
86
Although framed generally, much of the legal language
results.
87
appears favorable to both Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People and the
88
community at large. Establishing this regime was both its own struggle
and a direct response to years of repressive colonial interests that seized
Native lands and took massive quantities of stream water for plantation
agribusiness while decimating agrarian Maoli communities reliant on
89
continuous mauka to makai flow.
Today, in light of acknowledged wrongful land confiscation, cultural
90
destruction, and the devastation of Maoli communities, both the

Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the
Kingdom of Hawaii.”); see also Eric K. Yamamoto and Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing
Environmental Justice, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 311, 344 (2001).
85. See Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 316–17.
86. See HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7; HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C (1993); HAW. ADMIN. R.
§§ 13-167-1 to 13-171-60.
87. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c) (“Traditional and customary rights of
ahupua‘a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian
Islands prior to 1778 shall not be abridged or denied by this chapter. Such traditional and
customary rights shall include, but not be limited to, the cultivation or propagation of taro on
one’s own kuleana and the gathering of h[Ư]h[Ư]wai, [‘ǀ]pae, [‘]o‘opu, limu, thatch, ti leaf, aho
cord, and medicinal plants for subsistence, cultural, and religious purposes.”); id. § 174C101(d) (“The appurtenant water rights of kuleana and taro lands, along with those traditional
and customary rights assured in this section, shall not be diminished or extinguished by a
failure to apply for or receive a permit under this chapter.”).
88. See, e.g., In re Wai‘ola O Moloka‘i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 680 (Haw. 2004) (“The Code
mandates consideration of the large variety of public interests. The definition of ‘public
interest’ in the Code broadly encompasses the protection of the environment, traditional and
customary practices of native Hawaiians, scenic beauty, protection of fish and wildlife, and
protection and enhancement of the waters of the State.”).
89. Hawai‘i’s citizens came together in a constitutional convention and crafted
amendments to Hawai‘i’s constitution to elevate the management of natural and cultural
resources to a constitutional mandate, while also centralizing management of fresh water
under a single state agency to minimize political influence at the county level. See HAW.
CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7. In 1978, Hawai‘i’s voters ratified those amendments and in 1987
Hawai‘i’s State Water Code, Hawai‘i Revised Statutes chapter 174C, was implemented as a
comprehensive management tool for Hawai‘i’s water resources. See Sproat, Where Justice
Flows Like Water, supra note 66, at 1112; supra note 68 (discussing the evolution of Hawai‘i
law, including water, and its roots in Maoli culture).
90. Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
115051 (D. Haw. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005), reh’g en
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federal government and state legislature have separately committed to
91
reconciling with KƗnaka Maoli. Hawai‘i’s people embraced restorative
justice principles and ratified those obligations, even though the state as
92
a whole has struggled to actualize that commitment. On the ground in
93
the community, however, the law has produced limited salutary results.
The State’s commitment to reconciliation with KƗnaka Maoli is
particularly relevant in the context of Hawai‘i’s management of its
natural and cultural resources—especially the plantation history of
94
With these restorative justice goals in mind,
water appropriation.
Hawai‘i’s Constitution was amended and the Water Code adopted with
directives requiring the water commission to take the initiative to
protect and preserve the public’s interest in fresh water resources, with
95
specific provisions for Maoli rights and interests. Article XI, section 1
banc granted, 441 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006).
91. See, e.g., Apology Resolution, supra note 84, at 1; 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 956, § 1;
1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 1009, § 1(9); H.R. 1627, 26th Leg. (Haw. 2011); H.R. Con. Res. 179,
17th Leg. (Haw. 1993). The Apology Resolution, for example, apologized for and
acknowledged the significance of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i and agreed
to support reconciliation efforts. See Apology Resolution, supra note 84, at 8–9. It commits
Congress to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and
KƗnaka Maoli. Id. In 2011, Hawai‘i’s State Legislature reaffirmed its commitment to KƗnaka
Maoli by passing a new law acknowledging a special trust relationship between the United
States and Maoli. H.R. 1627, 26th Leg. (Haw. 2011).
92. See, e.g., Kamehameha Sch., 441 F.3d at 1174–75; Office of Hawaiian Affairs v.
Housing and Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 177 P.3d 884, 900 (Haw. 2008) (noting that “the
‘Apology Resolution by itself does not require the State to turn over the lands to the Native
Hawaiian people, but it puts the State on notice that it must carefully preserve these lands so
that a subsequent transfer can take place when the political branches reach an appropriate
resolution of this dispute’”); Haw. H.R. Con. Res. 179.
93. See, e.g., The Water Commission: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, ENV’T HAWAI‘I
(Env’t Haw., Hilo, Haw.), July 2010, at 2, 3 [hereinafter An Idea Whose Time Has Passed]
(“[T]he only purpose that the [w]ater [c]ommission seems to serve these days, so far as stream
restoration is concerned, is to give diverters years, even decades, of water as the challenges to
their use drags through the commission’s unwieldy . . . . Even after it issues its milquetoast
orders, it lacks the staff—to say nothing of the will—to enforce them.”).
94. For example, in 1993, the legislature established the Hawaiian Sovereignty Advisory
Commission to advise the legislature on how to “facilitate efforts of native Hawaiians to be
governed by an indigenous . . . nation of their . . . choosing” as “the indigenous people of
Hawai[‘]i were denied the mechanism for expression of their inherent sovereignty . . . and
self-determination, their lands, and their ocean resources.” 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 1009, 1010.
95. In a path-breaking decision, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court opined that the state water
commission “must not relegate itself to the role of a mere umpire passively calling balls and
strikes for adversaries appearing before it, but instead must take the initiative in considering,
protecting, and advancing public rights in the resource at every stage of the planning and
decisionmaking process.” In re Water Use Permit Applications (WaiƗhole I), 9 P.3d 409, 455
(Haw. 2000) (internal quotations omitted); see also HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-63, -101
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of Hawai‘i’s Constitution provides that “[a]ll public natural resources
96
are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.” Article XI,
section 7 of Hawai‘i’s Constitution makes explicit reference to water,
including the directive “to protect, control and regulate the use of
Hawai‘i’s water resources for the benefit of its people.” Significantly,
“article XI, section 1 and article XI, section 7 adopt the public trust
97
doctrine as a fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawai‘i.”
98
Many trace the public trust’s origin to English and Roman law.
Yet, long before the existence of the constitutional provisions described
above, cases and laws of the Hawaiian Kingdom, along with Maoli
custom and tradition, firmly established the principle that natural
resources (including water) were not private property, but were held in
99
trust by the government for the benefit of the people. Today under
Hawai‘i’s Constitution, Water Code, and common law, the “water
resources trust” applies to “all water resources without exception or
100
The public trust establishes “a dual mandate of (1)
distinction.”
101
The
protection and (2) maximum reasonable and beneficial use.”
water commission, therefore, has an “affirmative duty to take the public
trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and
102
to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.”
Thus far, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has identified only a handful of
“public trust purposes,” including environmental protection, traditional
(1993); supra note 89 and accompanying text (reviewing the 1978 Constitutional Convention
and its impacts).
96. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Some text here and for the next two paragraphs
previously appeared in SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 35.
97. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 444 (citations omitted) (citing Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263,
272 (1976)).
98. For a detailed analysis of common and Roman law development of the public trust
doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 47576 (1970).
99. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. of 1840, supra note 53, at 10–11 (noting that the first
constitution of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i declared that the land and its resources “belonged to
the chiefs and people in common, of whom [the King] was the head and had the management
of the landed property”); Hawai‘i Kingdom Laws of 1839, reprinted and translated in
TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, supra note
53, at 33 (reprinting an 1839 law respecting water for irrigation, which sought to manage
water resources for the common good); see also Sproat, Where Justice Flows Like Water,
supra note 66, at 56.
100. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 445.
101. Id. at 451.
102. Id. at 453 (emphasis removed) (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of
Alpine Cnty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983)).
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and customary KƗnaka Maoli rights, appurtenant rights, domestic water
103
uses, and reservations for the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands.
Public trust purposes have priority over private commercial uses, which
104
do not enjoy the same protection. The public trust dictates that “any
balancing between public and private purposes [must] begin with a
presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment” and
“establishes use consistent with trust purposes as the norm or ‘default’
105
Offstream diverters who seek water for their private
condition.”
commercial gain have the burden of justifying proposed uses in light of
protected rights in the resources, including traditional and customary
Maoli practices.
Many of the Water Code’s provisions were
purposefully crafted to rectify the monopoly of resources by a handful
of business interests (e.g., sugar plantations owned by descendants of
American colonists) to ensure that water supplies supported the entire
range of public uses and to prioritize certain uses, including Indigenous
106
rights and practices.
In addition to the Water Code, constitutional and statutory
103. Id. at 44850; In re Wai‘ola o Moloka‘i, 83 P.3d 664, 694 (Haw. 2004). Appurtenant
rights appertain or attach to parcels of land that were cultivated, usually in the traditional
staple kalo, at the time of the MƗhele. See Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 78
(Haw. 1982). The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands was established through the
enactment of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 42 Stat. 108 (1921). The HHCA
provides “rehabilitation of the native Hawaiian people through a government-sponsored
homesteading program” intended to “provide for economic self-sufficiency of native
Hawaiians through the provision of land.” Laws/Rules, DEP’T OF HAWAIIAN HOMELANDS,
http://hawaii.gov/dhhl/laws (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
104. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 454.
105. Id.
106. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2 (1993); see also WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 44950. In
WaiƗhole, the court explained its position as follows:
[W]e continue to uphold the exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional customary
rights as a public trust purpose. . . .
....
Although its purpose has evolved over time, the public trust has never been
understood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for private commercial gain. . . .
....
. . . [I]f the public trust is to retain any meaning and effect, it must recognize
enduring public rights in trust resources separate from, and superior to, the
prevailing private interests in the resources at any given time.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Wai‘ola, 83 P.3d at 680 (“The definition of ‘public interest’ in
the Code broadly encompasses the protection of the environment, traditional and customary
practices of native Hawaiians, scenic beauty, protection of fish and wildlife, and protection
and enhancement of the waters of the State.”).
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provisions also safeguard Indigenous rights and practices. For example,
Hawai‘i’s Constitution “reaffirms and shall protect all rights,
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and
religious purposes and possessed by ahupua‘a tenants who are
107
Moreover, Hawai‘i
descendants” of Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People.
Revised Statutes sections 1-1 and 7-1 provide independent protections
for traditional and customary Maoli practices, and water rights in
108
particular.
The Water Code’s basic structure for water resource management in
Hawai‘i, however, has not achieved the law’s stated purpose of
protecting and restoring fresh water resources, leaving the vast majority
of those resources in the hands of plantation or former-plantation
109
interests. The law gives water commissioners and communities a false
sense that the mere passage of a statute is sufficient and that nothing
more needs to be done. After all, because the Water Code is in place,
many assume that qualified water commissioners will be appointed,
sufficient funding will be sought and provided, and that commission staff
110
will implement constitutional and statutory mandates. In the pursuit
of justice through law, however, a more in-depth contextual
examination of the current state of water resource management in
111
The
Hawai‘i reveals an unsavory political and economic reality.
longstanding failure to establish scientifically based Interim Instream
Flow Standards (IIFSs) provides one example.
IIFSs are critical tools for water management in Hawai‘i because

107. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.
108. HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (1993) (noting the common law of England is “declared to
be the common law of the State of Hawai[‘]i in all cases, except as otherwise expressly
provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed
by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage”); id. § 7-1 (“[P]eople on
each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to take firewood, house-timber, aho cord,
thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their own private use, but they shall
not have a right to take such articles to sell for profit[; further, t]he people shall also have a
right to drinking water, and running water, and the right of way.”).
109. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-5 (detailing the water commission’s general
powers and duties), with An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 3 (“If the
Legislature had tried to invent a means of paying lip service to streams while leaving status
quo diversions intact and flourishing, it would have been hard pressed to come up with a
better solution than the water commission.”).
110. Sproat, Water, supra note 14, at 19194.
111. See, e.g., id.; An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 3 (“[T]he fact
remains: the [w]ater [c]ommission, as a tool for resolving stream disputes, is utterly,
hopelessly broken.”).
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they underpin the entire instream use and protection program. 112 An
IIFS establishes the minimum amount of water that must remain in a
stream, or a particular reach of a stream, to support beneficial instream
uses such as the maintenance of ecosystems and wildlife habitats, water
113
quality, and traditional and customary Native Hawaiian practices. The
Hawai‘i Supreme Court deemed IIFSs “the primary mechanism by
which the commission is to discharge its duty to protect and promote the
114
entire range of public trust purposes dependent upon instream flows.”
Given this vital role, the Water Code requires the commission to set
IIFSs “on a stream-by-stream basis whenever necessary to protect the
115
The commission also
public interest in the waters of the State.”
outlined an investigation and fact-finding process and mandated that
116
any IIFS or IFS “shall be adopted by the commission not later than
117
Nevertheless, the water commission did not approve
July 1, 1990.”
standards that were based on the Code’s rigorous requirements for
118
scientific analysis and consultation with expert agencies. Instead, the
commission simply adopted as IIFSs whatever amount of water, if any,
119
happened to be flowing in certain streams on a particular date. This
112. See WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000).
113. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (defining all beneficial instream uses of stream
water).
114. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 460.
115. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(1) (providing an overview of requirements for the
protection of instream uses, including the establishment of IIFS).
116. An IFS or Instream Flow Standard is a “quantity or flow of water or depth of water
which is required to be present at a specific location in a stream system at certain specified
times of the year to protect fishery, wildlife, recreational, aesthetic, scenic, and other
beneficial instream uses.” Id. § 174C-3. An IFS is permanent, whereas an IIFS is temporary.
In establishing an IIFS, the Commission must adhere to many of the same standards
established for an IFS. SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 22–23. The IIFS process is
supposed to be expedited, however, and the standard is more flexible in terms of how broadly
it may be imposed, when compared to a permanent IFS. Id.
117. HAW. ADMIN. R. § 13-170-2(e) (1988). The initial deadline was roughly three years
after the Water Code was enacted. Shortly thereafter, administrative rules specified that
IIFSs must be set for streams on the various Hawaiian Islands on a schedule ranging from a
July 31, 1987 deadline for Windward O‘ahu to a December 31, 1988 deadline for West Maui
and Leeward O‘ahu. Id. § 13-169-42 (“The commission shall adopt interim instream flow
standards as follows: (1) Windward O‘ahu by July 31, 1987; (2) East Maui and Kaua‘i by
December 31, 1987; (3) Hawai‘i and Moloka‘i by July 1, 1988; and (4) West Maui and
Leeward O‘ahu by December 31, 1988.”).
118. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(1)(E).
119. See, e.g., HAW. ADMIN. R. §§ 13-169-44 to -49; see also An Idea Whose Time Has
Passed, supra note 93, at 2 (explaining the process of establishing “non-quantified ‘interim’
flow standards, reflecting the status quo.”).
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was done without assigning any actual numbers to these standards,
120
making them practically impossible to enforce.
The water commission claimed that this action satisfied the legal
121
requirement of “protect[ing] the public interest” by identifying the
“flows of water necessary to protect adequately fishery, wildlife,
recreational, aesthetic, scenic, or other beneficial instream uses in the
122
123
stream,” while considering the “economic impact” of taking water
124
out of the stream for other “noninstream purposes.” These status quo
IIFSs, however, left the streams and their communities with little to no
protection and no immediate prospects of restoration, despite the Water
125
As the Hawai‘i
Code’s intent and admonitions to the contrary.
Supreme Court recognized,
The [c]ommission, obviously, cannot “implement” or
“protect” standards that do not exist. In order for the “instream
use protection” regime to fulfill its stated purpose, therefore, the
[c]ommission must designate instream flow standards as early as
possible, during the process of comprehensive planning, and
particularly before it authorizes offstream diversions potentially
126
detrimental to public instream uses and values.

120. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 2–3.
121. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(1)(C).
122. Id.
123. Id. § 174C-71(1)(E).
124. Id.
125. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 3 (“Protection and
restoration of streams and the customary and traditional uses associated with them are among
the commission’s primary purposes, as set forth by law. Over the last two decades, however,
the zeal with which it has pursued these goals has undergone a slow transformation.”).
126. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 409, 461 (citations omitted); see also WaiƗhole II, 93 P.3d 643,
654 (Haw. 2004). In WaiƗhole II, the Court also admonished the Commission for the delay in
setting instream flow standards:
We take this opportunity, however, to remind the [w]ater [c]ommission that
seventeen years have passed since the Water Code was enacted requiring the
[w]ater [c]ommission to set permanent instream flow standards by investigating
the streams. In addition, four years have passed since this court held that “the
Commission shall, with utmost haste and purpose, work towards establishing
permanent instream flow standards for windward streams.’ The fact that an IIFS is
before this court evinces that this mandate has not yet been completed as of the
[w]ater [c]ommission’s D&O II.
Id. (citations omitted). Temporary IIFSs and permanent IFSs “are the [w]ater [c]ommission’s
principal mechanisms to ensure that surface water rights and interests, including resource
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To this day, almost twenty-five years after the Water Code was passed,
the water commission has yet to issue even one permanent IFS and the
only IIFSs based on some actual information, rather than status-quo
diversions, have been established as a result of litigation.
As detailed in Part V, below, as the Hui experienced first-hand, even
with seemingly favorable legal language that embodies key contextual
factors, decision-makers continue to wield tremendous power to render
dubious and even retrogressive outcomes, under the guise of objectively
applying “neutral” laws. As this article demonstrates, in the broad array
of Native Peoples’ claims, contextual legal analysis must be employed to
do the heavy lifting of unpacking political and economic influences that
shape how rights and obligations are actually determined on the
127
A more contextual legal analysis is vital to illuminate the
ground.
specific claims of KƗnaka Maoli and the meaning of “justice” through
law in this dispute.
III. AN APPROACH TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ CLAIMS AND COURT
RULINGS
A. The Limits of Legal Formalism and Emergence of Legal Realism
To earnestly grapple with Indigenous issues in the context of water
and beyond, legal analysis cannot focus solely on “traditional” notions

protection, are adequately considered.” SPROAT, OLA I KA WAI, supra note 51, at 22. The
Water Code required the establishment and administration of an “instream use protection
program” when the Code was passed in 1987; however, the only standards that are based on
actual information have been set as a result of litigation, with the first such IIFSs established
in WaiƗhole. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71 (1993) (detailing the requirements of the
instream use protection program).
127. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 2.
It was widely thought that, as commission staff gained knowledge of the demands
made of stream resources, the commission would on its own adopt more
permanent flow standards and even identify and protect streams having high
value for recreation or resources. That, too, was a dream, undercut by the harsh
realities of insufficient information and, frankly, a complete failure of nerve in the
face of the political and economic juggernaut represented by the [sugar] planters.
Id. As one example of how political and other influences shape decision-making, the water
commission’s composition is the direct result of the political process with all of its members
appointed by the governor, after confirmation by the Senate. The Commission, COMMISSION
ON WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, http://hawaii.gov/dlnr/cwrm/aboutus_commission.ht
m#selection (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
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of rights because many such notions are grounded in Western concepts
128
of property that are not universally applicable, especially in Hawai‘i.
There is a need to go beyond the limited application of narrowly drawn
129
The formalist
legal rules to the selectively shaped facts of cases.
approach to Native Peoples’ claims, history shows, legitimized
colonialism, the confiscation of land, the destruction of culture, and the
130
destabilization of self-government.
1. The Limits of Legal Formalism
In the 1800s, legal formalism evolved in an attempt to deem the law
a neutral tool that produced justice by mechanistically applying legal
131
Classic legal formalism is a “theory of adjudication
rules to cases.
according to which (1) the law is rationally determinate, and (2) judging
is mechanical. It follows, moreover, from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is
autonomous, since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique
132
outcome; no recourse to non-legal reasons is demanded or required.”
Formalism, therefore, “holds that the law is an internally consistent
and logical body of rules that is independent from the variable forms of

128. See, e.g., Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d
1246, 1268 (Haw. 1995) (“Our examination of the relevant legal developments in Hawaiian
history leads us to the conclusion that the western concept of exclusivity is not universally
applicable in Hawai‘i.”); Reppun v. Bd. of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 63 (Haw 1982)
(clarifying that Hawai‘i’s system of water rights is “‘based upon and is an outgrowth of
ancient Hawaiian customs and methods of Hawaiians in dealing with the subject of water’”
(quoting Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 395 (1930))).
129. See Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 311 (noting that for racialized
communities and Indigenous Peoples, “environmental justice is mainly about cultural and
economic self-determination and belief systems that connect their history, spirituality, and
livelihood to the natural environment”).
130. See, e.g., Rennard Strickland, Genocide-At-Law: An Historic and Contemporary
View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 713, 735–39 (1986); Tsosie, supra
note 74, at 27–33; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of
Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 5355 (1991); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The
Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of
Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 23950 (1989).
131. See generally Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988)
(providing an in-depth discussion of legal formalism).
132. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 2 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Brian
Leiter, supra note 31, at 1145–46); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 639 (1999) (“Formalism therefore entails an
interpretive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that excludes or minimizes
extratextual sources of law.”).
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its surrounding social institutions.” 133
Given these theoretical
underpinnings, the “law was objective, unchanging, extrinsic to the
134
social climate, and, above all, different from and superior to politics.”
135
Although the prevailing view for many years —and still embraced
136
by some scholars and many law school curricula —legal formalism’s
failure to fully consider social and historical context, politics, culture,
and a myriad of other social factors impedes both the courts’ capacity to
render just decisions and the general public’s understanding of the law’s
role in shaping society. Legal formalism also constrains many groups’
ability to achieve any semblance of justice. “The message the formalist
model conveys is that existing power relations in the real world are by
137
definition legitimate and must go unchallenged.”
Formalist analysis, however, can neither explain nor predict how the
legal process actually works for Indigenous Peoples. History indicates
that legal formalism’s narrow lens employs rules (for example, the
133. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 2 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting MATHIEU
DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY TRADITION 98 (2008)); see also
Peer Zumbansen, Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn
of Reflexive Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769, 782 (2008) (noting that legal formalism may be
understood by “extrapolating a logical structure of a confined set of norms from a small set of
higher-order principles”).
134. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 731 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 187 (1988)). Tamanaha also raises questions about
whether the formalist–realist divide has been accurately framed: “Legal theory discussions of
legal formalism are irrelevant, misleading, or empty. Debates about judging are routinely
framed in terms of antithetical formalist–realist poles that jurists do not actually hold.”
TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 3; see also Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, The Real
Realists, and What They Tell Us About Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109
MICH. L. REV. 863, 866 (2011) (reviewing TAMANAHA, supra note 31). For a more in-depth
discussion of legal formalism, see Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U.
L. REV. 89 (1995).
135. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 4. According to Tamanaha, some jurists
abandoned formalism much earlier than the realist revolution in the 1920s: “Jurists in the late
nineteenth century, it turns out, took substantial pride in the progress they had made in
overcoming formalism in law. They thought formalism was a primitive legal stage beyond
which they had evolved.” Id.; see also Steven C. Papkin, The Transformation of American
Law, 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 565, 569 (1993)
(reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960
(1992)).
136. Not just conservative scholars embrace legal formalism; it remains the primary
method of teaching in law schools. See Singer, supra note 131, at 473 (“It is correct to
conclude that in certain ways, little changed by 1960. Even today, we still rely almost entirely
on appellate decisions in law school classes.”).
137. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 376 (1992).
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“intent of the framers”) and methods of reasoning (for example, stare
138
decisis) in ways that treat Native Peoples as inferior to Europeans and,
therefore, unworthy of self-governance; it also fails to provide either a
balanced perspective or a genuine vehicle to address legal and cultural
139
harms.
Consider the seminal case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, where the
Supreme Court analyzed whether Native Americans had lawful title to
their lands and could sell property to parties other than the countries
140
At issue was whether Johnson, who purchased
that colonized them.
land directly from the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations in 1775, had
superior title to M’Intosh, a war veteran who obtained title in 1818 from
141
the United States government. In crafting the Court’s opinion, Chief
Justice John Marshall relied on the doctrine of discovery, which
142
assumed European superiority over “fierce savages” and, thus, “gave
title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was
143
The Court recognized Native rights of occupancy only, as
made.”

138. Stare decisis is Latin for “stand by things decided” and is a legal term that refers to
a court’s obligation to abide by former court decisions. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537
(9th ed. 2009).
139. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 31517 (1990); JONATHAN KAY
KAMAKAWIWO‘OLE OSORIO, DISMEMBERING LƖHUI: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN
NATION TO 1887, at 44–73, 25060 (2002). See generally KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36
(detailing cultural harms to Native Hawaiians).
140. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571–72 (1823). This complex case
requires a detailed discussion to truly understand the impacts of the doctrine of discovery on
Native Americans. For a more thorough inquiry, see Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and
Indian Land Rights: A Historical Rejoinder to the Claim of “Universal Recognition” of the
Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 481, 48386 (2006) (discussing the
significance of Johnson v. M’Intosh).
141. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 555–56, 560, 572; see also David E. Wilkins, Johnson v.
M’Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
159, 16162 (1994).
142. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590–92. The Court justified the doctrine of discovery using
racism and ethnocentrism, for example, the decision characterized
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country [as] fierce savages, whose occupation
was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them
in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them
as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited
as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their
independence.
Id.
143. Id. at 573. The Court did, however, recognize the inherent right of Indigenous
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subordinate to the perceived superiority of European ownership. 144 The
decision used Western laws and practices to justify “the exclusive right
145
of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied by the Indians.”
After all, “[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror
146
cannot deny.”
As demonstrated by M’Intosh, the narrow lens of legal formalism
deployed established methods (stare decisis or precedent) to embrace
regressive rules (for example, the “doctrine of discovery”) in light of
selected facts (Natives as uncivilized “savages”) to award the United
147
The Court’s
States “lawful” title to all Native American lands.
decision fundamentally limited the ability of Indigenous Peoples within
148
the United States to control their own homelands and resources. Most
importantly, this was ostensibly accomplished under the “rule of law”—
149
the application of law to facts—while “respecting the original justice”

Peoples as
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of
it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations were necessarily diminished, and their power to
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the
original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who
made it.
Id. at 574. The Court went on to explain that “[t]he history of America, from its discovery to
the present day, proves, we think, the universal recognition of these principles.” Id.
144. Id. at 587–92; see also Tsosie, supra note 74, at 31 (“Under this colonial doctrine,
the Native American Nations were divested of their political right to cede lands or enter
political alliances with other sovereigns. The sovereigns transferred title to their successors in
interest. The right of occupancy entitled the Indians to continue their physical use and
occupancy of the lands until the right was extinguished by the sovereign through ‘purchase or
conquest.’” (quoting M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587))
145. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 584.
146. Id. at 588.
147. See id., 571–605; Tsosie has discussed the M’Intosh decision and its application (or
rather lack thereof) to Native Hawaiians as follows:
[T]he Kingdom of Hawai[‘]i was never subjected to the “Doctrine of Discovery”
that was used to subordinate Native American rights to land and sovereignty with
the legal fiction that, upon discovery and settlement of lands in the New World, the
Europeans and their successors in interest (e.g., the United States) received the full
title to the land, except for the Indian’s “right of occupancy.”
Tsosie, supra note 74, at 31.
148. Watson, supra note 140, at 485–86 (discussing the significance of Johnson v.
M’Intosh).
149. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588.
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of M’Intosh’s claim to land through the United States’ colonization of
the Americas.
For disenfranchised groups, however, legal formalism’s reach was
not limited to the nineteenth century. It continues to be utilized in
contemporary times to perpetuate the status quo while restricting
Native Peoples’ right to control their destinies. Rice v. Cayetano
150
provides a chilling example. In Rice, courts wrestled with whether the
151
election of trustees for OHA —a state agency established to combat
the lingering effects of colonization on Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People and
152
to create better conditions for them—could be limited to Maoli.
The lead plaintiff, Freddy Rice, was a White rancher whose
ancestors came to Hawai‘i in the mid-1800s as Christian missionaries
and eventually built a ranching empire on land that had formerly
153
Despite having benefitted personally
belonged to Native Hawaiians.
(including accumulating land and other resources) as a direct result of
his family’s role in colonizing Hawai‘i, Rice sued the State of Hawai‘i for
not allowing him to vote in OHA elections, claiming this restriction
154
155
contravened the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as well as the Fourteenth
156
Although each of those laws was
and Fifteenth Amendments.
150. 963 F. Supp. 1547 (D. Haw. 1996), aff’d, 146 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d,
528 U.S. 495, 498–99, 524 (2000); see also Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at 545–48
(deconstructing Rice and how the case was solicited and pursued by conservatives to roll back
protections for KƗnaka Maoli). The majority opinion ignored the present-day sovereignty
and self-determination movements and presented a sanitized retelling of Hawai‘i’s history.
Id. at 558. “Nor did the majority opinion acknowledge specifically the destruction of
Hawaiian culture through the banning of Hawaiian language or the current effects of
homelands dispossession, including poverty, low levels of education and health, and high
levels of homelessness and incarceration.” Id.
151. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed explanation of
OHA and its mission and objectives).
152. Rice, 528 U.S. at 49899. During the 1978 Constitutional Convention, Hawai‘i
amended its constitution to create the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. See HAW. CONST. art. XII,
§ 5. OHA’s mission is the “betterment of conditions of native Hawaiians” and “Hawaiians.”
HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-3(1) to -3(2) (2009); see also note 15 (describing OHA and its mission)
153. Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at 54548.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). This Act prohibits any state or political subdivision from
imposing or applying any “voting qualification or prerequisite . . . or [any] standard, practice,
or procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” Id. § 1973(a).
155. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits states from treating citizens unequally on the basis of race. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
156. The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that “[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
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specifically crafted to protect historically disadvantaged groups, Rice
turned the laws on their heads, wielding them against a historically
disadvantaged group to challenge the group’s ability to elect trustees for
an agency designed to manage Indigenous resources in partial redress
for the devastation imposed by American colonialism.
Judge David Alan Ezra of the District Court for the District of
Hawai‘i employed contextual analysis to reject Rice’s claims and rule in
157
favor of the State of Hawai‘i. Judge Ezra examined Hawai‘i’s history,
including Westerners’ role in fundamentally altering the Native system
of land use and management and eventually overthrowing the sovereign
158
Hawaiian Kingdom. He recognized Maoli as the Indigenous People of
Hawai‘i whose continuing relationship with the state and federal
159
government was analogous to other Native Peoples. Judge Ezra ruled
that OHA’s voting requirements were rationally tied to state and
160
On appeal to the
congressional trust obligations to KƗnaka Maoli.
161
Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, relying on formalist
162
The majority, led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, selectively
analysis.
163
framed Hawaiian history: it blurred the lines between Indigenous
164
Maoli and Rice’s ancestors (American colonists), and it ruled that
165
Ironically, although the majority
ancestry was a “proxy for race.”
invalidated the State’s voting process for OHA trustees because the
“use of racial classifications is corruptive of the whole legal order
166
democratic elections seek to preserve,” it effectively used the rule of

States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
157. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1548, 155358 (D. Haw. 1997). For more
discussion on contextual analysis, see infra Part IV.A.
158. Rice, 963 F. Supp. at 155152.
159. Id. at 155354.
160. Id. at 1554–55.
161. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998).
162. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498–99, 524 (2000).
163. Colonization and the Americans’ role in overthrowing Hawai‘i’s sovereign
government is explained away. As one example: “The United States was not the only country
interested in Hawai[‘]i and its affairs, but by the later part of the century the reality of
American dominance in trade, settlement, economic expansion, and political influence
became apparent.” Id. at 504.
164. See id. at 507–11.
165. Id. at 514 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here.”).
166. Id. at 517.
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law to allow non-natives to once again attempt to direct the
management of Indigenous Hawaiian land and other resources, which
167
the establishment of OHA had specifically sought to rectify.
Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent criticized the majority’s holding,
insisting that it rested “largely on the repetition of glittering generalities
that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the State
168
The majority failed to acknowledge the effects of
of Hawaii.”
annexation, the influx of infectious diseases, and the displacement of
Native Hawaiians from their lands, all of which continue to take a toll
169
on Native Hawaiians.
The Supreme Court’s majority decision reveals how legal formalists
pick and choose their method of analysis, such as applying a certain line
of cases to select facts to serve their own purpose. Formalist analysis is
often deployed to achieve a desired result, while appearing “neutral”
and as if the decision-makers were simply applying the “rule of law.”
Rice demonstrates that legal scholars and practitioners must examine
the values and interests that form the lens through which a decisionmaker will view and rule on evidence if they hope to rectify historic
wrongs.
2. The Emergence of Legal Realism
Legal realism emerged in the 1920s to “challenge[] the basic
understanding of the law as a formula that produces ‘correct’ or ‘just’
170
results when mechanically applied to specific cases.” Legal realism is
an approach to legal decision-making that recognizes that “[s]ocial
context, the facts of the case, judges’ ideologies, and professional
consensus critically influence individual judgments and patterns of
171
decisions over time.” Realists contended that the so-called rule of law
“created an illusion of certainty that masked the unspoken social and
political assumptions guiding much judicial decision making. The
exposure of this illusion of certainty led to [r]ealist pronouncements of

167. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing OHA’s mission).
168. Rice, 528 U.S. at 527–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 532, 534.
170. Isaac Moriwake, Comment, Critical Excavations: Law, Narrative, and the Debate on
Native American and Hawaiian “Cultural Property” Repatriation, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 261,
287 (1998). For an in-depth analysis of Legal Realism and related theories, see Singer, supra
note 131, and Bell, supra note 137, at 365.
171. Singer, supra note 131, at 470.
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the indeterminate nature of the law.” 172 Legal realists worked to
“develop new kinds of general rules that would be useful in predicting
legal outcomes and in shaping the law better to serve the needs of
173
In doing so, legal realists inspired a host of other
society.”
movements, including law and society, critical legal studies, feminist
174
legal theory, law and economics, and critical race theory.
More recently, empirical research has documented the role and
175
“Judges
degree of philosophical influences on judicial decisions.
routinely admit the presence of ideological influence on decisions, but
they also insist that it comes into play in a relatively small proportion of
176
cases.” “More dramatic differences tend to show up in areas in which
judges have a greater discretion and the issues at stake have strong

172. Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach
to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1055–56 (2003)
(citations omitted); see also John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies
Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45
DUKE L.J. 84, 8889 (1995).
173. Singer, supra note 131, at 471.
174. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 32628 (1987); see also Bell, supra note 137, at 36368. Critical
legal studies and critical race theory are discussed in more detail in Parts III.B and III.C,
respectively. For additional information on critical legal studies, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl
E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461, 461–62 (1984). For
more background on the law and society movement see Austin Sarat, Vitality Amidst
Fragmentation: On the Emergence of Postrealist Law and Society Scholarship, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). For insight on
feminist legal theory, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 586–90 (1990). For a more detailed discussion of law and economics
see generally Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757
(1975).
175. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 8 (“Balanced realism recognizes the inevitability of
various political influences on judging, but it also identifies the appropriate role and limits of
this influence.”); see also Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 261 (1995) (“Evidence also
exists of a correlation between the president appointing a judge and case outcomes.”);
Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the
First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 347–54 (2003).
See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure
of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965 (2007).
176. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 144. Individual judges have also conceded that
“their different backgrounds, experiences, perceptions, and former involvements” are all
“part of the intellectual capital they bring to the bench.” Id.; see also Gregory C. Sisk &
Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical
Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 754 (2005); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1476–79 (2003).
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ideological or personal overtones.” 177 Yet judges are not “free agents”
doing as they please: “[J]udges are subject to very significant
178
constraints,” including public perceptions of their legitimacy.
Discussed in depth in Part IV.A, below, contextual analysis
establishes that in order to understand how the law operates both
generally and for Native Peoples in particular, the legal community and
the community at large must know: Who crafts the laws? Who
interprets the laws? Who benefits from the laws? Who is hurt by the
laws? What is at stake when the laws are “blindly” applied? And, what
institutional and public constraints limit judges in their decision179
making?
B. The Evolution of Critical Legal Analysis
Like other jurisprudential schools, critical legal analysis emerged
from the shadows of legal realism in the 1980s to “critique[] the
ostensible objectivity and neutrality of the law and the legal process.” 180
Critical legal scholars agreed with many of the realists’ fundamental
insights, including that institutional practices and political views heavily
181
Similar to the realists, critical legal
influenced the judicial process.
scholars expressed “skepticism that law can produce determinate results

177. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 141 (internal quotations omitted). “The differences
on specific issues can rise to shocking levels: Carter-appointed judges upheld minority claims
in race discrimination cases 78 percent of the time, whereas Reagan appointees did so 18
percent (this extreme difference was almost double the next largest disparity).” Id. at 140
(citing C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 49 (1996)). See generally Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and
Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).
178. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 144 (quotations omitted); see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1833 (2005) (“Justices who defy
aroused public opinion risk, and they know that they risk, provoking a political backlash that
ultimately could cause their doctrinal handiwork to collapse.”). Following Bush v. Gore, 533
U.S. 98 (2000), the Supreme Court justices’ motives and integrity were criticized by the
public. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT
178 (2007). Their decision was deemed “a sham, a political fix, a putsch.” Id. In response,
Scalia said, “[w]e had to do something, because countries were laughing at us.” Id.
179. See JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA 34 (2000) (articulating tools of critical inquiry, including the questions
identified here); Scholar Advocacy Workshop #1 with Eric K. Yamamoto, Professor of Law,
William S. Richardson School of Law, in Honolulu, Haw. (June 1, 2011) (same).
180. Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation: An Overview, in RACE,
RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 3, 12 (2001)
[hereinafter Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation].
181. Id.
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free from reference to value, politics, or historical conditions.” 182
Critical Legal Studies is characterized by skepticism toward the
liberal vision of the rule of law, by a focus on the role of legal
ideas in capturing human consciousness, by agreement that
fundamental change is required to attain a just society, and by a
utopian conception of a world more communal and less
183
hierarchical than the one we know now.
Importantly, critical legal scholars moved beyond legal realism to
challenge the power structure that underpins society. For example,
scholars pointed out that law and the judicial process were in difficult
cases often a function of “hidden politics” that used the guise of neutral
decision-making to maintain the social and legal status quo and benefit
184
These scholars questioned the ability of the law to
those in power.
level the playing field and instead viewed the legal process as a tool to
distract underrepresented groups with the notion of rights while
185
Over time, different schools of
continuing to marginalize them.
thought emerged within critical legal analysis, and the movement
186
became fractionalized.
Despite its insights, critical legal analysis was challenged as elitist
187
This “ivory tower”
and out of touch with the majority of society.
discourse made for interesting debates, but did not go far enough to
bring about real change on the ground in the communities that needed it
188
the most. Critical legal studies also failed to resonate completely with
people of color and other marginalized groups who recognized the law’s
ability to subordinate, but who also refused to abandon the legal system
wholesale due to its potential to liberate when applied in the right
189
context.
182. Matsuda, supra note 174, at 326–27, 332 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 32627.
184. Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation, supra note 180, at 12.
185. Id.
186. See infra notes 198–199 and accompanying text.
187. Matsuda, supra note 174, at 342–45.
188. Id. at 345–49.
189. See Eric Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 869 (1997) [hereinafter
Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis] (“[Marginalized groups] understand the limits of ‘rights talk’
and the ways in which civil rights laws can be used to reinforce the racial status quo. They
also, however, perceive potentially transformative value in law and rights assertion for
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C. Insights of Critical Race Theory
190
Critical race theory emerged in the late 1980s and altered critical
191
legal theory by infusing the voices and experiences of people of color.
Much of this theory arose out of concern “over the slow pace of racial
reform in the United States” as well as the notion “that the civil rights
movement of the 1960s had stalled, and indeed that many of its gains
192
It also developed as a reaction to critical
were being rolled back.”
193
To address these
legal studies’ “trashing” of civil rights discourse.
setbacks, critical race scholars challenged institutionalized racism and
194
sought to remedy injustice for a host of marginalized groups. Critical

disempowered groups, and they embrace modernist notions of hope and justice through
reconceived ideas of law and political struggle.”); see also Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1356
(critiquing critical legal studies’ “failure to analyze the hegemonic role of racism”).
Conservatives also criticized critical legal studies, claiming that it completely abandoned the
rule of law, which amounted to nihilism. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) (calling critical legal studies scholars “nihilists” and asking
them to leave the legal academy); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13–16 (1986) (contending that the critical legal studies field was
dangerous because it “mean[s] the death of the law, as we have known it throughout history,
and as we have come to admire it”).
190. Some trace the evolution of critical race theory to the 1970s. Compare Introduction
to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xv, xvi (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic] (“Critical [r]ace [t]heory sprang
up in the mid-1970s with the early work of Derrick Bell (an African American) and Alan
Freeman (a white) . . . .”), with Francisco Valdes et al., Introduction: Battles Waged, Won, and
Lost: Critical Race Theory at the Turn of the Millennium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 1, 1 (Francisco Valdes, et al. eds., 2002) (pinpointing
critical race theory’s emergence in the legal academy in “the late 1980s”), and Crenshaw,
supra note 3.
191. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 35580 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
232326 (1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 13921406 (1991); Tsosie,
supra note 74, at 43 (finding that critical race theory “enables us to transcend formal equality
and, building on the truth of the political, social, economic and spiritual conditions
experienced by a people, to analyze alternative possibilities to achieve justice”); Patricia J.
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 409410 (1987).
192. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 190, at xvi.
193. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 158 (1991); Robert
L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern Constitutional
Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 61 (1995); Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis,
supra note 189, at 869.
194. See, e.g., Tsosie, supra note 74, at 22. Critical race theory “is a jurisprudence of
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race scholars, like the critical legal scholars before them, viewed the law
and legal rules as indeterminate. At the same time, as Mari Matsuda
observed, “[t]he minority experience of dual consciousness
accommodates both the idea of legal indeterminacy as well as the core
195
belief in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy.” Critical race
theory thus “illuminates and offers a beginning response to the
limitations of legal justice for racial minorities. It does so by employing
critical pragmatic tools to examine racial justice in connection with the
196
interplay of law, race, culture, and social structure.”
Grounded in critical theory, critical race scholars explored how the
law excluded certain groups and benefitted others; in doing so, these
scholars helped to “reveal the social construction of legal concepts
presented as fixed and natural, challenge the efficacy of both liberal
legal theory and communitarian ideals as vehicles for racial progress,
destabilize the supposedly neutral criteria of meritocracy and social
197
order, and call for a re-examination of the very concept of ‘race.’”
Critical race theorists have not placed their faith in neutral
procedures and the substantive doctrines of formal equality;
rather, critical race theorists assert that both the procedures and
substance
of
American
law,
including
American
antidiscrimination law, are structured to maintain white
privilege. Neutrality and objectivity are not just unattainable
ideals; they are harmful fictions that obscure the normative
198
supremacy of whiteness in American law and society.

possibility precisely because it rejects standard liberal frameworks and precisely because it
seeks to be inclusive of different groups and different experiences.” Id.
195. Matsuda, supra note 174, at 341.
196. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 189, at 867.
197. Id. at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra
note 190, at xvi.
198. Valdes et al., supra note 190, at 1. Charles R. Lawrence III, Mari Matsuda, Richard
Delgado and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw identify the “defining elements” of critical race
theory. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6–7 (1993). Critical race theory
“recognizes that racism is endemic to American life.” Id. at 6. It is skeptical about
“dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy” and
“challenges ahistoricism and insists on a contextual/historical analysis of the law.” Id. It
“insists on recognition of the experiential knowledge of people of color . . . in analyzing law
and society” and “is interdisciplinary and eclectic.” Id. Finally, it “works toward the end of
eliminating racial oppression as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of oppression.”
Id.
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Critical race theory has come a long way since its inception. The
focus on anti-discrimination law and the larger goal of equality opened
doors for a new civil rights legal analysis. Different schools of thought
199
200
have evolved and offshoots and methodologies have grown and
changed over time. Together, “[c]ritical race theorists demand not only
simple legal reform but also actual social transformation; the prize has
201
become social, economic, and political equity, not formal equality.”
IV. CONTEXTUAL LEGAL INQUIRY INTO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
CLAIMS AND ADJUDICATORY RULINGS
Critical race theory’s insight, particularly its identification of
institutional or systemic roots of subordination and proactive emphasis
on social transformation, provides an apt foundation for contextual
inquiry into Indigenous Peoples’ legal claims by Western courts and
decision-making bodies. At the same time, just as critical legal studies
failed to acknowledge the persistence of racism and significance of civil
rights claims for communities of color, critical race theory does not fully
202
Although Mari
illuminate legal controversies for Native Peoples.
199. One example of the different schools of thought that have evolved are idealists who
combat discrimination by seeking to eliminate negative images versus realists or materialists
who believe that material factors are more decisive. Tsosie, supra note 74, at 22–29. For
another in-depth discussion of a different school of thought within critical race theory, see
Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365 (2003).
200. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 4–8
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003) (describing various feminist canons having grown out of
Critial Race Theory).
See generally HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING:
CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES 147170 (1995); Delgado &
Stefancic, supra note 199, at xvii–xviii (identifying some of critical race theory’s unique
methodologies, including different forms of legal writing, such as storytelling, satire, etc.);
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411, 2435–41 (1989); Harris, supra note 174, at 590–601; Charles R. Lawrence, III, If
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438–49
(1990); Francisco Valdes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and
Latina/o Self Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 5258 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Sex
and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 25, 46–64 (1995). The use of narrative in feminist and critical
race scholarship has been criticized by some. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay On Legal Narratives, 45 STAN L. REV. 807
(1993).
201. See Valdes et al., supra note 190, at 4.
202. Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 344; see also Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theories for Peoples of
Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. 103, 122 (1987) (“Among the perils of [critical legal studies] for
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Matsuda 203 and Eric Yamamoto204 opened the critical race theory door to
Indigenous Peoples’ claims through their key works, the larger body of
critical race theory does not expressly integrate Indigenous Peoples’
205
inimitable histories, cultural factors, and present day goals. For Native
Peoples, the pursuit of justice is less about equality and more about selfdetermination, including the return and restoration of traditional lands
206
and other resources. Although critical race theory offers an important
starting point for contextual legal inquiry into Native Peoples’ claims,
there are “often substantial differences among immigrant racial
populations in America, imported slaves, and conquered indigenous
207
Given these dissimilarities, contextual legal inquiry into
peoples.”
Native claims must “focus[] on the effects of land dispossession,
cultur[al] destruction, loss of sovereignty, and, in turn, on claims to self208
determination and nationhood (rather than equality and integration).”
A. Contextual Legal Analysis: A Synthesis
Flowing from legal realism’s critique of formalism and the key
insights of critical race theory, contextual legal analysis synthesizes the
most important insights of the “new realism” and critical inquiry. This is
especially important in highly complex and controversial cases such as
NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, where decision-makers often employ formalist language to
shroud the actual dynamics of their rulings. As quantitative studies
peoples of color is its tendency to abandon and marginalize reliance upon what it regards as a
false vision. . . . It is far too easy for someone on a law professor’s salary to offer open-ended
reconstructive projects which may bring immense benefits to a future generation.”).
203. Matsuda wrote the seminal article on reparations for KƗnaka Maoli. Matsuda,
supra note 174, at 368–88; see also Tsosie, supra note 74, at 41–43 (calling for the development
of critical race theory in the realm of Native Peoples’ environmental justice claims).
204. Eric Yamamoto established the need for critical race theorists to modify their
analysis to account for the unique interests and values of Native Peoples in Racializing
Environmental Justice, supra note 84, at 344.
205. Id. A number of scholars have examined Native issues using critical race theory
methodologies. See, e.g., Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 197–99; Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1475–78 (2002). See generally Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun,
Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 625 (1990).
206. See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human
Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309, 342
(1994) [hereinafter Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law]; Tsosie,
supra note 74, at 42–43; Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 311.
207. Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 84, at 344.
208. Id.
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have demonstrated, however, contextual factors and political
perspectives play a significant role in shaping adjudicatory outcomes,
even though decision-makers may feel constrained to follow the rules to
appear legitimate.
“A recent study of the Supreme Court found ‘strong evidence that
legal principles are influential.’ But it cannot be denied that the
ideological views of justices have some impact on their legal
209
decisions.” This is particularly applicable in difficult cases like NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ that have tremendous cultural, economic, legal, and political
ramifications because “judges have admitted for decades that personal
values can have an influence on their decision in uncertain or hard
210
Empirical studies have also “suggest[ed] that judges care[]
cases.”
211
about getting the correct legal result.” Despite the pressure to appear
legitimate, every decision requires judgment calls that are influenced by
individual perspectives. “[J]udges’ personal philosophies enter into
their decision-making when statute or precedent does not point their
discretion in one direction or constrain it in another. . . . In such cases
212
personal philosophies may well play a significant role in judging.” For

209. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 132 (quoting Michael J. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman,
Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 102 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 369, 381 (2008)); see id. (noting that despite the role of
precedent, “the ideological views of Supreme Court justices have a measurable influence on
their legal decisions”); VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT
30–32 (2006); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 238 (1999) (“[P]robing all civil rights and liberties and
economics decisions by the Supreme Court between 1969 and 1985, finds unanimous
decisions distinctly more liberal than nonunanimous decisions . . . [and] concludes that
ideology clearly affects unanimous civil rights and liberties decisions.”); Gregory C. Sisk, The
Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision
Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 879 (2008) (reviewing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS (2007)).
210. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 146 (emphasis added); see also Michael C. Dorf,
Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 972 (2003) (“A hard
case is hard because fleshing out ambiguous legal text calls for a controversial moral
judgment.”).
211. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136; see Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87
TEX. L. REV. 183, 224 (2008) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008))
(“Judge Posner recognizes that the crucial test for pragmatism is not whether it gets an
individual case ‘right’ (in an equitable or other sense) but instead whether it produces the best
overall systemic effects.”).
212. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 143 (quotations omitted) (quoting Patricia M. Wald,
A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 236 (1999)); see also Frank B. Cross
& Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1437, 1437–38 (2001).
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example, “conflicting lines of precedent often exist, allowing judges to
213
Given the role of
‘follow those precedents which they like best.’”
personal philosophies in decision-making, it is crucial to interrogate
what the rules say, who the decision-makers are (and what political
views and ideologies guide them), and what the consequences of a
decision are. Without resolving these and other questions, a-contextual
analysis will continue to hide what is really going on behind the guise of
impartiality.
With this backdrop, socio-legal empirical studies have exposed dual
realities of legal adjudication: (1) decision-makers do not follow
formalist analysis in controversial cases, but (2) decision-makers
nevertheless feel constrained to try to follow the rules to appear
legitimate. Although experts disagree on the precise impact of
ideological influence, “[m]ore dramatic differences tend to show up in
areas in which judges have greater discretion and the issues at stake
214
David E. Klein’s
have strong ideological or personal overtones.”
study, for example, scrutinized decision-makers’ behavior in legally
uncertain cases with broad implications (including political
215
This included “environmental law cases, [and other]
implications).
216
subjects that are thought to have particular political salience.” “The
key lesson of the ideology effects is quite clear: Judges prefer to adopt
217
In other words, the study “found a
policies they agree with.”
statistically significant correlation between political preferences and the
rules adopted: liberal judges preferred liberal rules, whereas

213. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 14344 (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Changing Course:
The Use of Precedent in the District of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 477, 481
(1986)); see also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 271 (1997).
214. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 141; see also ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND,
POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 60 (1983). See generally
Grossman, supra note 177, at 155658.
215. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 40–
41 (2002); see also TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136 (discussing Klein’s methodology and
results); Sisk, supra note 209, at 892 (noting that “empirical studies certainly have confirmed
that judges, at the margins and in the difficult cases, are influenced by their background,
experiences, and, yes, even ideology”).
216. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136 (discussing KLEIN, supra note 215).
217. KLEIN, supra note 215, at 81; see also TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136 (citing
KLEIN, supra note 215, at 81–85). See generally Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with
It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001).
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conservative judges preferred conservative rules.” 218
As detailed herein, contextual legal analysis accounts for both
realities. It starts with the language of rules, while acknowledging that
in complex or controversial cases, rule language alone does not dictate
219
the formal legal result. As developed in Part III.A, realists and critical
legal theorists have conclusively demonstrated that the language of most
substantive rules (or case holdings) is malleable enough to afford legal
decision-makers a range of choices, each potentially supporting different
220
Contextual legal analysis interrogates the rulevalues and interests.
related choice made (measured against rejected choices), the values and
interests served by that choice, and its short and long-term
consequences.
Contextual legal analysis reveals that in complex cases such as NƗ
Wai ‘EhƗ, the decisional outcome was not necessarily “objectively
determined,” as formalist analysis would imply, but rather a matter of
choices partially influenced by the interests and values accommodation
undergirding the law and by decision-makers’ political and economic
221
helps judges fully and
perspectives.
This contextual analysis
accurately assess both the “legal” and “justice” impacts of their

218. TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 136.
The novelty of Klein’s study is that, while it confirmed that political influences
matter in precisely the situations one would expectlegally uncertain cases raising
politically fraught issuesit also demonstrated that even in these contexts judges do
not care only about politics but continue to be moved by legal considerations.
Id. at 136–37; see also Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 156679 (2010).
219. See supra Part III.A.
220. See supra Part III.A.
221. For a discussion of approaches to contextual analysis in law, see Bell, supra note
137, 36468; Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597,
160206 (1990) (describing the ways that context matters in decision-making); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 HOW. L.J. 241
(2006) (advancing contextual analysis for the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny
standard of review). Without expressly saying so, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has employed a
version of contextual legal analysis that has been especially attentive to politics, economics,
and culture, both historically and in terms of current conditions. See WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d 409
(Haw. 2000) (addressing water rights); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cnty. Planning
Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995) (addressing traditional and customary Native Hawaiian
rights of access and gathering); Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 87 P.2d 1247, 127172 (Haw. 1992)
(addressing traditional and customary Native Hawaiian rights of access and gathering);
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 31011 (Haw. 1982) (addressing water rights); McBryde
Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1345 (Haw. 1973) (addressing water rights).
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decisions on the people and communities involved, as well as society at
large. This reflects the first reality described above (judges do not
blindly follow precedent).
The decision-maker is not, however, simply a “free agent” ruling in
222
The language of the law is important,
whatever way she prefers.
although malleable, because it imposes some degree of constraint upon
decision-makers who are concerned about legitimacy: the decisionmaker must interpret and apply the law so the result appears at least
plausible enough to maintain that the judge “followed the rule of law.”
This assertion reflects the second reality described above. Again,
contextual legal inquiry assesses and reveals the range of options
available to a decision-maker in light of the law’s language and focuses
on the decision-maker’s choice.
Having removed the cloak of inevitable neutrality and objectivity,
contextual legal analysis inquires into and reveals the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a decision under the rule of law by asking about and
223
What values and interests are being furthered
assessing the context:
by the rule and according to what policy preference? What values and
interests are being disserved? How would the selection of a competing
“choice” serve values and interests differently? How do history and
current cultural and economic conditions and larger policy concerns
shed light on whether a decision was appropriate or inappropriate
(especially when measured against other available choices)?
In this way, contextual legal analysis integrates both “realities” of
decision-making in complex or controversial cases, and exposes for
participants and the public “what is really going on” and “what the
decision really means.” Yet, for Indigenous Peoples who are differently
situated than others because of the long-term impacts of colonialism,
224
contextual legal inquiry itself needs further refinement to explicitly
222. See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 175758 (2004) (“A judge’s
place in the constitutional structure and judicial hierarchy, a judge’s relationship with litigants
and lawyers, and a judge’s stature in the legal community and broader polity help to explain
both why judges tend to limit themselves to the cases before them and why judges are
constrained by existing legal materials in the course of deciding those cases.”).
223. See PEREA ET AL., supra note 179, at 34 (articulating tools of critical inquiry,
including the questions identified here); Scholar Advocacy Workshop #1 with Eric K.
Yamamoto, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, in Honolulu, Haw.
(June 1, 2011) (same).
224. Given the importance of contextual legal inquiry (with roots in legal realism and
critical race theory), a developing contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims must be
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integrate Native Peoples’ unique history and cultural values into a larger
analytical framework that accounts for restorative justice and the key
225
dimensions of self-determination.
B. Contextual Legal Analysis of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims and
Adjudicatory Rulings
Contextual legal inquiry for Native Peoples’ claims employs the
analytical tools of contextual legal analysis, as just described, in
assessing how the law operates and should operate and in exposing the
shortcomings of formalism. At the same time, this evolving framework
embraces unique features to discern what justice looks like for
Indigenous Peoples, particularly where restorative justice is among the
aims of the legal regime. Those features often include restoring selfgovernance, rebuilding suppressed culture, and returning natural and
cultural resources upon which culture depends to enable renewed
spiritual and other connections to the natural environment through
226
From a broader perspective, this developing
traditional practices.
framework does not focus on “equal treatment,” but instead
encompasses a restorative justice approach informed by principles of
self-determination that are particularly apt in light of the ravages of
227
colonization.

specifically tailored to more incisively interrogate government decisions and rulings,
particularly where the claims are controversial and implicate land, culture, economic
development, or governance. See infra Part IV.C. In unraveling the fundamental struggle
over water and power in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, for example, contextual legal inquiry provides a
framework to understand what justice truly means for KƗnaka Maoli and Hawai‘i’s
community at large. This analysis also exposes how a mechanistic approach to the law often
prevents participants and society from discerning the actual injustice of an action or decision.
225. Applying Hawai‘i’s Constitution or Water Code without the necessary historical or
cultural context, for example, can ignore the fundamental importance of water to Maoli
people and culture and the significance of cultivating the staple crop, kalo, both as an
important source of food and as the symbolic act of caring for an elder siblingnot to
mention specific legal provisions enacted to protect these rights and interests. See supra
Part II. Too formalistic of an approach also dismisses deep cultural harms that colonialism in
general and the relatives of plantation owners in particular imposed on KƗnaka Maoli
throughout Hawai‘i for over a century both within and beyond NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ. HONOLULU
BD. OF WATER SUPPLY, WATER FOR LIFE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF WATER ON
O‘AHU, available at http://www.boardofwatersupply.com/files/Wfl_Website.pdf (explaining
that the sugar industry created a huge demand for water, and “[d]iverting the water ultimately
meant diverting everything”); TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 1519 (detailing the specific
impacts of plantations on NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ).
226. See infra Part IV.C.
227. See supra Part II.A; see also Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination,
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More specifically, tailoring this contextual legal framework for
Native Peoples requires attention to four realms (or “values”) of
restorative justice embodied in the human rights principle of selfdetermination: (1) cultural integrity; (2) lands and natural resources;
228
(3) social welfare and development; and (4) self-government.
Indigenous Peoples have been damaged by the forces of colonialism in
each of these four realms, which are both customarily significant and
recognized by international human rights principles as salient
229
dimensions of restorative justice.
As detailed herein, each of the four values of self-determination and
restorative justice for Native Peoples is significant because they are
inextricably intertwined. Culture cannot exist in a vacuum and its
integrity is linked to land and other natural and cultural resources upon
230
which Indigenous Peoples depend for physical and spiritual survival.
In turn, Native communities’ social welfare is defined by cultural
231
Finally,
veracity and access to, and the health of, natural resources.
cultural and political sovereignty determine who will control Indigenous
Peoples’ destinies (including the resources that define their cultural
integrity and social welfare) and whether that fate will be shaped
232
internally or by outside forces (including colonial powers).
Colonization imposed significant cultural harms on Native Peoples,
especially in the realms of cultural integrity, lands and natural resources,
233
social welfare, and self-government. In the context of KƗnaka Maoli,

and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 89102 (2008); R. Hǀkǌlei Lindsey,
Native Hawaiians and the Ceded Lands Trust: Applying Self-Determination as an Alternative
to the Equal Protection Analysis, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 223, 257 (2009–2010).
228. See Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206,
at 34260. Jim Anaya coalesced international human rights principles of self-determination
to identify the four analytical categories utilized in this developing framework. Id.; see also
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
229. See Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206,
at 34260; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
230. See Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206,
at 34647.
231. See id. at 34849.
232. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 197 (“[T]he central challenge of cultural
sovereignty is to reach an understanding of sovereignty that is generated from within tribal
societies and carries a cultural meaning consistent with those traditions.”).
233. See supra Part II. As one example,
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for example, the documented arrival of Westerners in Hawai‘i,
beginning in 1778 led to physical and cultural genocide, as was the case
234
with Indigenous Peoples the world over. Living in the most isolated
island chain in the world made the Native population particularly
235
KƗnaka Maoli were decimated,
susceptible to introduced diseases.
with the pre-European contact population going from about a million to
236
Foreigners also
less than 40,000 within the first century of contact.
employed other tools of colonialism; for example, foreigners imposed
English as the language of instruction in schools and banned cultural
237
Principal among these
activities, including traditional hula dancing.
238
was the displacement of KƗnaka Maoli from their homelands. Over a
period of years beginning in about 1845, a system of private property
239
was imposed. Despite best intentions, this resulted in stripping most
240
In the end, less than half of one
Natives of title to ancestral lands.
percent of Hawai‘i’s total land area was distributed to maka‘Ɨinana (the
people of the land) via this MƗhele process and land quickly passed to
241
In addition to severely
foreign and largely American interests.

many Hawaiians found they no longer could farm or gain access to the traditional
gathering areas in the mountains and the ocean that once supported them. Other
Hawaiians were left landless. As a result, many were forced to move to urban areas
to seek employment. They abandoned traditional subsistence living, which had
supported the Hawaiian culture for centuries.
Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at 315–16
(quoting NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 44 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed.,
1991)).
234. See O.A. BUSHNELL, THE GIFTS OF CIVILIZATION: GERMS AND GENOCIDE IN
HAWAI‘I 13254 (1993) (detailing the impact of foreign diseases on the Maoli population);
see also Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
315 (quoting NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 233, at 44). See generally
STANNARD, supra note 49.
235. See BUSHNELL, supra note 234, at 13454 (detailing the impact of foreign diseases
on the Maoli population). See generally STANNARD, supra note 49.
236. See supra note 49; BUSHNELL, supra note 234, at 13454 (detailing the impact of
foreign diseases on the Maoli population).
237. See Richard R. Day, The Ultimate Inequality: Linguistic Genocide, in LANGUAGE
OF INEQUALITY 163, 166–67 (Nessa Wolfsman & Joan Manes eds., 1985).
238. See generally KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36, at 816; JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO
OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI‘I? 30–53 (2008).
239. For a detailed explanation of the MƗhele process, which “transformed the
traditional Land system from one of communal tenure to private ownership on the capitalist
model,” see KAME‘ELEIHIWA, supra note 36, at 8–16.
240. Id. at 9–11.
241. See supra note 36; DAVIANNA PƿMAIKA‘I MCGREGOR, NƖ KUA‘ƖINA: LIVING
HAWAIIAN CULTURE 3740 (2007). But see Donovan C. Preza, The Emperical Writes Back:
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restricting KƗnaka Maoli’s ability to continue subsistence lifestyles,
alienation from land and water resources had a devastating
psychological effect given KƗnaka Maoli’s strong spiritual and familial
242
Ultimately, these harms culminated in the
connection to the land.
1893 overthrow of Hawai‘i’s independent Kingdom by a handful of
243
missionary descendants assisted by the United States military. This is
just one example; many other Indigenous Peoples have similarly heart244
wrenching stories.

Re-Examining Hawaiian Dispossession Resulting from the MƗhele of 1848 13843 (May
2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Hawai‘i at MƗnoa) (on file with author)
(explaining that the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom ultimately led to the dispossession
of Maoli from traditional homelands as non-Maoli disproportionately benefitted from
government land sales.).
242. Martin et al., supra note 62, at 7273 (“Just as a plant wilts and loses strength in the
absence of water, Hawaiian life has suffered as access to water diminished through the
dominance of foreign beliefs, values, practices and concepts of private property.”).
243. Apology Resolution, supra note 84. Maoli today face many social challenges as a
result of the harms of colonization. KƗnaka Maoli are disparately impacted by morbid
obesity, substance abuse, depression, and other mental illnesses, diabetes, respiratory illness,
heart disease, and cancer mortality. BROOKE S. EVANS, OBESITY IN HAWAII: HEALTH
POLICY OPTIONS 3, 6, available at http://www.publicpolicycenter.hawaii.edu/images/PDF/Ob
esity%20White%20Paper.pdf.
Further, Maoli are disadvantaged socioeconomically.
S.M. KANA‘IAUPUNI ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY AMONG NATIVE HAWAIIANS:
SUMMARY OF KA HUAKA‘I FINDINGS 1 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.ksbe.edu/spi/
PDFS/Reports/Demography_Well-being/05_06_5.pdf. For example, KƗnaka Maoli families
in Hawai‘i have the lowest mean family income of all major ethnic groups in the state.
Id. at 2. In addition, Maoli are overrepresented and disparately treated in the criminal justice
system in Hawai‘i. See generally OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, THE DISPARATE
TREATMENT OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10–13 (2010),
available at http://www.oha.org/images/stories/files/pdf/reports/ir_final_web_rev.pdf. The
study found that Maoli are disproportionately represented at every stage of the criminal
justice system in Hawai‘i. Id. at 17. Further, this disparate impact increases as Maoli navigate
deeper into the system. Id. Taken as a whole, the study’s findings explain “how an
institution, fueled by tax payers’ dollars, disparately affects a unique indigenous group of
people, making them even more vulnerable than ever to the loss of land, culture, and
community.” Id. at 10.
244. Native Americans were also forcibly assimilated and stripped of their lands with
lingering effects. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 60–63 (1999).
“[S]ome facts, figures and demographics remain deeply troubling: 31% of the total American
Indian population, and 51% of Indians residing on reservations, live below the official
government poverty level; while only 13% of the total United States population is in this
predicament.” Id. at 65. Similarly, after annexation by the British, New Zealand’s Maori
were also dispossessed of their ancestral homelands and although some gains have been
made, much remains to be resolved. See id. at 7071. More recently, the Yanomami of the
Amazon are being driven from their lands by miners, who destroy the forest and bring
epidemic diseases. Id. at 76–77. “Some Yanomami are killing themselves, committing the

12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

176

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 12:41 PM

[95:127

For these reasons, international human rights principles of selfdetermination recognize each of the four realms as salient dimensions of
restorative justice for Indigenous Peoples, which are necessary to begin
to address longstanding physical, cultural, and other harms. “The
notion of respect for cultural determinism has long been a feature of
245
In much the same way,
bilateral as well as multilateral treaties.”
Indigenous Peoples’ rights and relationships to ancestral lands and other
resources have also been recognized and upheld by a host of
international protections, including the Declaration on the Rights of
246
Indigenous Peoples, which the United States recently signed.
Entitlements regarding social welfare and development are “also
grounded in the U.N. Charter and adjoined to the principle of self247
“In the particular context of indigenous peoples,
determination.”
notions of democracy (including decentralized government) join with
precepts of cultural integrity to create a sui generis self-government
248
This norm “upholds the accommodation of spheres of
norm.”
first known suicides in Yanomami history.” Id. at 77.
245. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
343; see also, e.g., Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation,
Proclaimed by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, 14th Sess., Nov. 4, 1966, art. I (declaring that “[e]ach culture has a
dignity and value which must be respected and preserved”); The Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 5, 429 U.N.T.S. 93, 100 (acknowledging “the
right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including
the maintenance of schools and, depending on the education policy of each State, the use or
the teaching of their own language”); Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (defining genocide as “acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such”);
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (upholding rights of freedom of expression, religion, and
“association with a national minority”).
246. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 198 (“Emerging principles of
international human rights law recognize the distinctive relationship of indigenous peoples to
their lands and resources, and attempt to define certain rights of self-government and cultural
protection.”).
247. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
350. See U.N. Charter arts. 55–56 (declaring the U.N.’s support of the proposition that “the
creation of conditions of stability and well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples”).
248. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
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governmental or administrative autonomy for indigenous communities,
while at the same time upholding measures to ensure their effective
participation in all decisions affecting them left to the larger institutions
249
of government.”
For Indigenous Peoples, contextual legal analysis entails examining
history and current socio-economic conditions in the context of the four
realms related to Native Peoples’ self-governance. Each of these values
is customarily significant and recognized by international human rights
principles of self-determination as salient dimensions of restorative
250
justice for Indigenous Peoples. “Thus, our challenge today is to reach
back into the past and locate the core elements which will play a role in
251
the development of our collective future.”
C. Four Indigenous Values for Contextual Legal Analysis
1. Cultural Integrity
Contextual legal analysis of Indigenous claims highlights cultural
integrity because of its salience to Native Peoples. 252 As Ty KƗwika
Tengan explained, “[c]ulture, place, and gender are deeply intertwined
253
and cannot be separated from one another.” For example,
355. Sui generis means “of its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009).
249. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
355; see also Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 117475
(2008).
250. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
34260; see also W. Michael Reisman, International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 25, 35 (1996) (“Political self-determination and economic selfdetermination may be important, but it is the integrity of the inner worlds of peoples—their
rectitude systems or their senses of spirituality—that is their distinctive humanity. Without an
opportunity to determine, sustain, and develop that integrity, their humanity—and ours—is
denied.”); Wiessner, supra note 249, at 1175 (explaining that Indigenous Peoples should have
the right to self-determination and to establish a restorative framework).
251. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 196.
252. See, e.g., id. at 202 (“[P]ast and future generations [are] related to the present
generation by core elements of cultural existence which may not be destroyed or removed.
This is the essence of cultural sovereignty, which posits that culture is the living basis for the
survival of Indian nations as distinct political and cultural groups.”); see also Marina
Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural
Identities of Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 201, 22627
(2005).
253. TY P. KƖWIKA TENGAN, NATIVE MEN REMADE: GENDER AND NATION IN
CONTEMPORARY HAWAI‘I 5 (2008).
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Hawaiian men in general have lost their place and role in
society. Often they linked this to the loss of the old ways—the
religious formations, political systems, cultural practices, and
relationships to the land that our ancestors knew. With the
arrival of colonialism, Christianity, and modernization, all of
these configurations of knowledge and power were radically
254
transformed; some say there were lost to the Pǀ [darkness].
Given this central role, weighing cultural impacts is a necessary
starting point for any contextual legal inquiry involving Indigenous
Peoples. “The right of indigenous peoples to maintain the integrity of
their cultures is a simple matter of equality, of being free from historical
and ongoing practices that have treated indigenous cultures as inferior
255
Moreover, this “right to equality and its
to the dominant cultures.”
mirror norm of non-discrimination are at the core of the contemporary
256
“While in principle the cultural
international human rights regime.”
integrity norm can be understood to apply to all segments of humanity,
the norm has developed remedial aspects particular to indigenous
257
peoples in light of their historical and continuing vulnerability.” Over
time, as outsiders have “come to consider indigenous cultures as equal
in value to all others, the cultural integrity norm has developed to entitle
indigenous groups like the Native Hawaiian people to affirmative
measures to remedy the past undermining of their cultural survival and
258
to guard against continuing threats in this regard.”
254. Id. at 56.
255. S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move
toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 16 (2004) [hereinafter Anaya,
International Human Rights and Indigenous People]; see also Graham, Reparations, SelfDetermination, and the Seventh Generation, supra note 227, at 103.
256. Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous People, supra note 255, at 16;
see also Megan Mooney, How the Organization of American States Took the Lead: The
Development of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the Americas, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 553, 556–
70 (2007) (detailing the development of the collective and individual rights of Indigenous
Peoples); Ruti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 31517 (1997)
(discussing contemporary human rights).
257. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
345. This norm applies to “all aspects of an indigenous group’s survival as a distinct culture,
understanding culture to include economic or political institutions, land use patterns, as well
as language and religious practices.” Id. at 343–44; see also Raidza Torres, The Rights of
Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 127, 159
(1991).
258. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
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Indigenous Peoples are in a constant struggle to maintain culture
and traditional lifestyles due to a myriad of factors, including
259
colonization and other pressures of a quickly changing world. “From
an ethical standpoint, the destruction and abuse indigenous heritage has
suffered at the hands of modern society is simply unwarranted and
260
The United Nations affirmed, in its Declaration
merits reparation.”
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, that Natives maintain the right to
“practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This
includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and
261
future manifestations of their cultures.”
Critical legal analysis into Native rights, therefore, must explicitly
analyze history and socio-economic conditions in the context of cultural
integrity and whether actions or decisions support and restore cultural
integrity as a partial remedy for past harms, or perpetuate conditions
262
that continue to undermine cultural survival. As Rebecca Tsosie and
Wallace Coffey explain, “[T]radition provides the critical constructive
263
material upon which a community rebuilds itself.” Exploring impacts
to Native culture and tradition are, thus, vital to understanding past
harms and shaping meaningful redress because, “only by delving into
the inquiry of how our Ancestors saw the world can we truly understand
the significance of our communities as they are currently constituted,
appreciating both the strengths and continuities that exist, as well as the

345. See generally Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rep., Annex V ¶3,
U.N. Doc. A/52/18, GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 18 (1997) (detailing the measures to be
taken to protect Indigenous Peoples).
259. Kristin Ann Mattiske, Recognition of Indigenous Heritage in the Modern World:
U.S. Legal Protection in Light of International Custom, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1105, 1109
(2002).
260. Id. at 1111.
261. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Art. 11, G.A.
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); see also Mattiske, supra note 259, at
1120 (discussing a draft of the declaration).
262. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
346. Diversity among Indigenous People,
however, does not undermine the strength of the cultural integrity norm as much as
it leads to an understanding that the norm requires diverse applications in diverse
settings. In all cases, the operative premise is that of securing the survival and
flourishing of indigenous cultures through mechanisms devised in accordance with
the preferences of the indigenous peoples concerned.
Id.
263. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 199 (quotations omitted).
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pathologies that destroy community.” 264
2. Land and Resources
“The importance of lands and resources to the survival of indigenous
265
As one example, “[l]ike many
cultures is widely acknowledged.”
other native people, [KƗnaka Maoli] believed that the cosmos was a
unity of familial relations. [Their] culture depended on a careful
relationship with the land, [their] ancestor, who nurtured [them] in body
266
and spirit.”
Recognizing and respecting this sacred relationship between Native
Peoples and other natural and cultural resources, including land, is a
necessary “response to the historical processes that have afflicted
indigenous peoples, including the Native Hawaiians, by trampling on
their cultural attachment to ancestral lands, disregarding or minimizing
their legitimate property interests, and leaving them without adequate
267
means of subsistence.” Considering this value is also required because
268
“[p]roperty has been affirmed as an international human right.”
Consequently,

264. Id.
265. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
346; see also JULIAN BURGER, REPORT FROM THE FRONTIER: THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1316 (1987) (detailing Indigenous philosophies on land);
Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 205 (“This relationship between land and the Native
people transcends the idea of land as a means of physical survival or subsistence. Land also
ensures the cultural survival of the Indian people as distinct groups and nations.”).
266. Preface to HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, LIGHT IN THE CREVICE NEVER SEEN (1994).
Likewise, this perspective is shared by other Native Peoples. See Yamamoto & Lyman, supra
note 84, at 33738. Yamamoto and Lyman note that “Native communities in the United
States tend to share general cultural value and belief systems that are distinguishable from
those of the Western world.” Id. For example, in many American Indian belief systems,
there exists “an intimate relation between the spiritual world, the physical world, and the
social world.” Id. at 336 (quoting Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red
Squirrel Piñatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a
Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133, 1153 (1994)); see also MCGREGOR, NƖ
KUA‘ƖINA, supra note 241, at 4–6.
267. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
348; see also Lee Swepston, A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 677, 696–705 (1990)
(detailing a concurring analysis of land rights).
268. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
347; see also Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for
International Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 71, 128 (2005).
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[i]n light of the acknowledged centrality of lands and resources
to indigenous cultures and economies, the requirement to
provide meaningful redress for indigenous land claims implies an
obligation on the part of states to provide remedies that include
for indigenous peoples the option of regaining lands and access
269
to natural resources.
The appropriation of ancestral homelands and resources facilitates
270
Indigenous Peoples’ loss of identity and culture. For example, KƗnaka
Maoli had an “intricate land system [that] mirrored and sustained the
271
complexity of Native Hawaiian spiritual and physical relationships.”
Lands also provided and continue to offer a means of self-determination
because a land base allows Indigenous Peoples to live and develop
272
273
freely to pursue their cultural and political sovereignty.
A developing contextual framework for Native Peoples therefore
must directly analyze history and current socio-economic conditions
with the intent of understanding whether a particular action perpetuates
the subjugation of ancestral lands, resources, and rights, or attempts to
redress historical injustices in a significant way. This is especially
important given that “the histories that have been constructed about
Native people are often inaccurate and have been used to justify the
dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources, and even
274
their cultural identity.”
3. Social Welfare and Development
The concepts of social welfare and development are also integral to
any contextual legal inquiry into Indigenous claims because these values

269. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
34849; see also Sweptson, supra note 267, at 696705; Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status
of the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 9798 (1998) (“The Native
Hawaiians belong to the only native group in the United States that has never been allowed
to utilize a claims commission or other mechanism to seek redress for its losses from the
federal government.”).
270. Sweptson, supra note 267, at 705.
271. Lindsey, supra note 227, at 243.
272. Id. at 238.
273. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1063 &
n.79 (2007) (“[T]erritorial and political sovereignty are inextricably linked with cultural
sovereignty[,] and . . . cultural devastation is [a] likely consequence if tribes lose [the] ability
to live in separate, self-governing communities.”).
274. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 200.
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are aimed at remedying two distinct but related historical
phenomena that result in most indigenous communities living in
an economically disadvantaged condition.
The first such
phenomenon entails the progressive plundering of indigenous
peoples’ lands and resources over time, processes that have
impaired or, as in the case of Native Hawaiians, devastated
indigenous economies and subsistence life and left indigenous
people among the poorest of the poor. The second corresponds
with patterns of discrimination that have tended to exclude
members of indigenous communities from enjoyment of the
social welfare benefits generally available in the states within
275
which they live.
During the colonization of Hawai‘i, many KƗnaka Maoli did not
obtain Western title to their ancestral homelands and became members
of the “floating population crowding into the congested tenement
districts of the larger towns and cities of the Territory under conditions
which many believed would inevitably result in the extermination of the
276
race.” Today, Maoli “comprise the most economically disadvantaged
and otherwise ill-ridden sector of the Islands’ population. . . . Native
Hawaiians are overrepresented among the ranks of welfare recipients
and prison inmates and are underrepresented among high school and
277
college graduates, professionals, and political officials.”
Given the importance of “health, education, an adequate standard of
278
living,” and other social welfare measures to the continued survival of
any group, contextual inquiry into Native claims must examine history
and socio-economic considerations. Hopefully, this will expose whether
a given action or decision improves social welfare conditions or
perpetuates the status quo of Natives bringing up the bottom of most, if
275. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
35253 (citations omitted); see also Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal
Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1751, 176061 (2003).
276. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
315 (quoting NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 233, at 44).
277. Id. at 317; see also Graham, supra note 227, at 92 (“There is little doubt that
centuries of land dispossession, cultural and political oppression, and discrimination have led
to many of the social welfare challenges facing Native American nations today.”).
278. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
351. For a detailed explanation on social welfare rights, see William E. Forbath,
Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1821, 185567 (2001).
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not all, socio-economic indicators. 279 Put simply: does a decision have
the potential to improve health, education, and living standards, or not?
4. Self-governance
Finally, Native Peoples’ contextual legal inquiry should address
Indigenous groups’ ability to manage their political and cultural
sovereignty. Because years and generations of colonization around the
world facilitated
their non-dominant positions within the states where they live,
indigenous communities and their members typically have been
denied full and equal participation in the political processes that
have sought to govern them. [Moreover, e]ven as indigenous
individuals have been granted full rights of citizenship and
overtly racially discriminatory policies have diminished, the
persistent condition of indigenous groups is typically that of
economically disadvantaged numerical minorities.
This
condition, shared by Native Hawaiians, is one of political
280
vulnerability.
Throughout what is now considered the United States, the
systematic dispossession of Indigenous Peoples from their lands and
other resources facilitated the loss of political autonomy, leaving many
Native populations dependent upon the federal government. In
response, international human rights law recognizes Indigenous Peoples’
unique relationship to their lands and resources and has attempted to
281
define rights of self-government and cultural protection. Cultural and
political sovereignty is essential for Indigenous Peoples’ selfdetermination. Unfortunately, however, “the nation-states (including
the United States) have refused to recognize indigenous peoples’ rights
to self-determination—the realization of a separate autonomous
political existence that would limit or constrain the ability of the
279. See supra notes 243–244 and accompanying text (detailing social welfare impacts on
Indigenous Peoples).
280. Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
356; see also Angela (Riya) Kuo, Let Her Will Be Done: The Role of the Kamehameha
Schools’ Admissions Policy in Promoting Native Hawaiian Self-Determination, 13 ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 72, 7378 (2008); Van Dyke, supra note 269, at 96 (“Native Hawaiians are now at the
bottom of the socio-economic scale in their own lands.”). See generally Forbath, supra note
278.
281. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 198.
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colonizing nations to control the political existence of indigenous
282
peoples.”
For example, not dissimilar from other places around the world, the
history of Hawai‘i
is a story of violence, in which that colonialism literally and
figuratively dismembered the lƗhui (the people) from their
traditions, their lands, and ultimately their government. [In
Hawai‘i, t]he mutilations were not physical only, but also
psychological and spiritual. Death came not only through
infection and disease, but through racial and legal discourse that
crippled the will, confidence, and trust of the KƗnaka Maoli as
283
surely as leprosy and smallpox claimed their limbs and lives.
Although scholars disagree about the implications of the United
284
States’ role in the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, it is
difficult to deny the deplorable social welfare conditions and political
285
The
vulnerabilities that continue to plague the Maoli community.
United States has thus far refused to “federally recognize” the inherent
sovereignty of KƗnaka Maoli. Remedial measures to redress the health,
educational, and other disparate impacts of colonialism continue to be
challenged, circularly, using laws that were specifically crafted to protect
historically disadvantaged groups, leaving Maoli physically and
286
politically vulnerable.

282. Id.
283. OSORIO, supra note 139, at 3.
284. See, e.g., Julian Aguon, The Commerce of Recognition (Buy One Ethos, Get One
Free): Toward Curing the Harm of the United States’ International Wrongful Acts in the
Hawaiian Islands, ‘OHIA (forthcoming 2012) (deconstructing KƗnaka Maoli international law
claims); Anaya, Native Hawaiians and International Human Rights Law, supra note 206, at
31415 (“United States troops invaded Hawaii and helped depose the King’s successor,
Queen Liliuokalani, and replace her with a provisional government. American residents
subsequently established the short-lived ‘Republic of Hawai‘i’ and forced the imprisoned
Queen to abdicate officially. The United States formally annexed Hawaii in 1898, despite the
fact that the only expression of indigenous Hawaiian opinion on the issue was a petition to
Congress, signed by about 29,000 Hawaiians, protesting the annexation.”); Tsosie, supra note
74, at 32 (quoting Matsuda, supra note 174, at 370) (“[T]he overthrow was accomplished by
the use of ‘American military intervention against the will of a majority of Hawaiian citizens,
in violation of international law as well as American foreign policy.’”).
285. See, e.g., supra note 277 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part III.A.1 (deconstructing the Rice litigation and its impact on KƗnaka
Maoli); infra Part IV.D (analyzing the Doe v. Kamehameha Schools litigation).
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Given this painful history, a developing contextual legal framework
for Native claims must consider whether a decision perpetuates
historical conditions imposed by colonizers or will attempt to redress the
loss of self-governance. Time and again, “the law often replicates the
287
This is especially
same script portrayed in American history.”
important because histories written by non-Native “people to justify the
colonial conquest and dispossession of Native people continue to
provide the truth in cases where Native testimony is perceived as biased
288
and non-Native experts are seen as biased purveyors of truth.”
Together, these four realms—(1) cultural integrity; (2) lands and
natural resources; (3) social welfare and development; and (4) selfgovernment—inform the contextual legal analysis of history and current
socio-economic conditions necessary to discern the true impacts of
actions or decisions on Native Peoples.
D. Brief Illustration of Contextual Legal Analysis of Indigenous Peoples’
Claims and Adjudicatory Rulings
One recent case offers insight into how differing modes of analysis—
formalist and contextual—yield starkly contrasting assessments of court
rulings in a KƗnaka Maoli legal controversy. The differing appraisals
underscore the importance of contextual legal analysis for Indigenous
Peoples’ claims, especially in politically-charged cases.
289
In Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, the
federal courts wrestled with whether a post-civil war reconstruction
statute required a private school, created to educate KƗnaka Maoli
290
The
children, to change its admission policy and admit non-natives.
Kamehameha Schools is a “charitable testamentary trust established by
the last direct descendent of King Kamehameha I, Princess Bernice
Pauahi Bishop, who left her property in trust for a school dedicated to
291
the education and upbringing of Native Hawaiians.” Plaintiff, a nonnative applicant, challenged the school’s admissions policy on the
grounds that he was denied entry because of his race, violating a civil
287. Coffey & Tsosie, supra note 74, at 201.
288. See id.
289. 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Haw. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 416 F.3d 1025 (9th
Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted sub nom., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Kamehameha, 441 F.3d 1029
(9th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc sub nom., Doe v. Kamehameha, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006).
290. See, e.g., Kamehameha, 470 F.3d at 829.
291. Id. at 831 (quoting Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661,
663 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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rights law that bans racial discrimination when making or enforcing
292
contracts.
At the outset, Judge Alan Kay of the District Court for the District
of Hawai‘i faced a United States Supreme Court case (where a
University denied African Americans admission to maintain a white
student body) that interpreted the civil rights law and held that private
293
The formalist
schools cannot employ race to exclude applicants.
analysis urged by plaintiff would have deemed the case “binding” and
invalidated Kamehameha’s admissions policy without attention to the
historical setting, current conditions, or larger consequences for
294
The one exception to the civil rights
Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People.
law’s racial differentiation prohibition rested on a judicial finding that
295
the underlying policy addressed a “legitimate remedial purpose.”
“Precedent” interpreting that language, however, focused on affirmative
296
action in private businesses, which was inapplicable in Doe. Formalist
analysis thus appeared to dictate rejection of Kamehameha’s arguments.
Judge Kay focused on the same legal language of the exception but
deeply contextualized the interpretation. He found that history linked
to current socio-economic conditions rendered the school’s admissions
policy both “remedial” and “legitimate,” and he granted summary
297
judgment in favor of Kamehameha.
Judge Kay acknowledged the “exceptionally unique circumstances
involving a private school, which receives no federal funding, with a
remedial race-conscious admissions plan to rectify socioeconomic and
educational disadvantages resulting from the influx of western
298
He determined that Hawai‘i’s history of colonization,
civilization.”
the United States’ role in the overthrow of the Indigenous Hawaiian
monarchy, and the harms resulting in daily consequences for Hawai‘i’s
Indigenous People—including educational deprivation, loss of lands,
homelessness, poor health, and high incarceration rates—provided “a
legitimate justification for Kamehameha Schools’ . . . admissions policy

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 834.
Id.
Kamehameha, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 116465.
Id. at 1165–72, 1174–75.
Id. at 1147.
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and education program, which serves a legitimate remedial purpose.” 299
Indeed, as Judge Kay determined, Pauahi Bishop created a school for
Maoli children as a pro-active response to the ravages of
“Westernization”—a self-determination driven remedial measure by
KƗnaka Maoli for KƗnaka Maoli.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the majority of a three-judge panel
300
The Ninth Circuit panel turned a blind eye to Hawai‘i’s
reversed.
history.
In considering whether Kamehameha had “legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons” for its admissions policy, the Ninth Circuit
panel ignored Judge Kay’s historical analysis and restricted its inquiry to
301
Through this a-contextual,
affirmative action in employment.
formalist analysis, the panel concluded that the school’s policy was not
“remedial” but rather “preferential” and not “legitimate” but
302
impermissibly “racial.”
Critical legal analysis reveals that in controversial cases like Doe,
even if decision-makers feel constrained by legal rules, the language of
rules alone will not dictate the end result. Instead, the language of most
substantive rules—such as whether “legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons” exist—is malleable enough to offer decision-makers a range of
options and an ultimate choice influenced by their own political and
economic philosophies. Judge Kay’s contextual legal analysis, which
was attentive to Hawai‘i’s Indigenous history and its linkage to current
socio-economic conditions, more openly surfaced the social and political
dimensions of judicial decision-making in contentious cases that are
often hidden by formalist analysis. In doing so, he gave meaning to the
relevant legal language in ways consistent with Hawai‘i’s history, current
socio-economic conditions, and values of Indigenous self-determination.
Doe thus underscores both the promise and limits of legal justice for
303
The decision also highlights the significance of
Native Peoples.
299. Id.
300. Doe v. Kamehameha, 416 F.3d 1025, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005).
301. Id. at 103039.
302. Id. In 2006, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case en banc and reversed the threejudge panel. Doe v. Kamehameha, 470 F.3d 827, 829 (9th Cir. 2006).
303. For an example of how employing contextual legal analysis could also benefit
Native Peoples, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1974). In Morton, the United
States Supreme Court considered a class action brought by non-Indian employees of the
Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) who challenged the BIA’s policy of first hiring and
promoting Indians, alleging that it discriminated against them on racial grounds. Id. at 537.
The lower court deployed a formalist tool of viewing the law broadly to hold “that the Indian
preference was implicitly repealed by § 11 of the 1972 Act proscribing racial discrimination in
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contextual legal analysis of Native claims—an analysis that explicitly
considers history and current socio-economic conditions in the context
304
of the four values of Indigenous self-determination.
most federal employment.” Id. at 540.
On appeal, the Supreme Court employed contextual legal inquiry to more
comprehensively examine the impact of the United States’ history on Native Americans. In
dramatic contrast to Johnson, this framework revealed a new understanding of the
“settlement” of the Americas that considered history to discern the impacts of colonization
on Native Peoples (including impacts on cultural integrity, lands and resources, social welfare,
and self-governance) and the federal government’s resulting trust obligations. Id. at 54143.
The Court contemplated who crafted the laws that were being challenged and why those laws
and their preference policy was necessary, asserting as follows: “The preference, as applied, is
granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign
tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.” Id. at
554. The Court acknowledged that such action was necessary to repair the harms of
colonization, the confiscation of Native lands, the suppression of Indigenous culture, the
imposition of dismal social welfare conditions, and to remedy the denial of self-governance.
Id. at 54142. “The purpose of these preferences, as variously expressed in the legislative
history, has been to give Indians a greater participation in their own self-government; to
further the Government’s trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the
negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.” Id.
The Court conceded that such laws were “[o]ne of the primary means by which selfgovernment would be fostered and the Bureau made more responsive was to increase the
participation of tribal Indians in the BIA operations.” Id. at 543. After considering who
claimed to be hurt by the hiring policy (Whites), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
ruling that “[a]ny other conclusion can be reached only by formalistic reasoning that ignores
both the history and purposes of the preference and the unique legal relationship between the
Federal Government and tribal Indians.” Id. at 550.
By utilizing contextual legal inquiry to incorporate new understandings and more
accurate history, the Supreme Court in Morton upheld government acts aimed at repairing
the long-standing damage of American colonization. History, when combined with cultural
values and current social welfare concerns, sheds light on the necessity of the BIA’s
preference policy. By respecting that policy, the Court sought to restore cultural integrity,
attempt to redress historic injustices, and improve social welfare conditions, all of which
resulted from the denial of self-governance, suppression of Native culture, seizure of ancestral
lands, and imposition of dismal social welfare conditions. Importantly, the Hawai‘i District
Court relied on Morton to rule in favor of the State of Hawai‘i in Rice v. Cayetano. See Rice
v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1550–51 (1997). The district court thoroughly examined
Hawai‘i’s history before ruling that allowing Maoli to elect trustees to manage their land and
other resources was rationally related to the government’s interest in repairing the damage of
American colonialism in Hawai‘i. Id.
304. For example, first, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doe would maintain disparate
social welfare conditions instead of allowing a private educational trust to focus resources on
closing educational gaps for KƗnaka Maoli. Second, contextual legal analysis reveals that Doe
would prolong historical conditions imposed by colonizers as opposed to allowing a Native
institution to make independent educational and other self-governance decisions necessary to
care for its own people. Third, forcing an Indigenous institution to open its doors to nonnative students reduces cultural learning opportunities for KƗnaka Maoli, undermining
cultural survival as opposed to restoring cultural integrity. Fourth, by disallowing
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V. THE WATER COMMISSION’S NƖ WAI ‘EHƖ RULING: CONTEXTUAL
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF NATIVE PEOPLES’ CLAIMS
These contextual insights also help to refine what justice means for
NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s people and communities, and how legal rights should be
305
interpreted and applied. For the Hui and its allies, restoring water to
NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ is about more than legal victory, or even the actual
restoration of water to streams; this struggle is about something far
deeper. The groups seek na‘au pono: a deep sense of justice that one
can feel in his or her gut; that, hopefully, will breathe new life into
dormant constitutional and statutory provisions while returning the
physical and spiritual resources necessary to restore Native ecosystems
306
and cultural practices and improve social welfare conditions. Through
this shifted framework, legal norms can realistically engender a more
just result.
As detailed more specifically in Part V.B, below, na‘au pono for
KƗnaka Maoli and their allies cannot be achieved through litigation
alone, or even through new legislation. This deep sense of justice must
be sustained through initiatives grounded in reparatory justice; that is, a
series of collaborative projects and programs, backed by laws and
community organizing that are aimed less at achieving “legal rights” on
paper and more on repairing the persistent damage of colonization to
307
KƗnaka Maoli. This developing framework starts with the language of
rules but acknowledges that, in complex or controversial cases, rule
language alone will not determine the final outcome. Although
decision-makers may feel constrained to follow legal rules to appear
“legitimate,” they do not consistently do so in a “neutral” or “objective”
308
Instead, decisional outcomes are often a matter of value
manner.
choices influenced by the decision-makers’ political and economic

Kamehameha’s admissions policy, Doe perpetuates the subjugation of Native lands and
resources. Instead of allowing the revenues from an Indigenous land base to educate its own
people, Doe requires those resources to be used for the benefit of non-Maoli as well. This
decision highlights the importance of culture and history in developing a contextual legal
framework for Native Peoples in general and KƗnaka Maoli in particular.
305. See supra Parts III–IV.
306. HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 257.
307. See Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Reframing Redress: A “Social
Healing Through Justice” Approach to the United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu
Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 3236 (2009).
308. See supra Part IV.A.
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ideologies. 309 To strive for na‘au pono, contextual legal analysis must
consider impacts on the four realms of cultural integrity, lands and
resources, social welfare and development, and self-government, with
the special political and cultural circumstances of Native Peoples and, in
310
this context, KƗnaka Maoli in particular. By examining, for example,
Indigenous Peoples’ physical and spiritual relationship to natural and
cultural resources and the impacts of colonization, legal and other
analysis can begin to conceptualize the deep desire for justice that
311
As demonstrated here, contextual legal
Native Peoples maintain.
analysis of Native Peoples’ claims is vital to any quest for justice;
otherwise, decision-makers will be free to deploy formalist methodology
to maintain the current state of affairs.
A. Life and the Law in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ
Some never accepted the social contract that had evolved in NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ during the late 1800s and early 1900s where plantations drained
312
streams, but provided jobs and other income for the community. This
arrangement became even less palatable when Wailuku Agribusiness
ceased agricultural operations and implemented a liquidation plan,
transforming itself into Wailuku Water Company, LLC (“WWC”) and
313
By 2003, community members
selling contracts for water delivery.
314
They questioned the propriety of
began rallying in opposition.
continuing to drain NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s streams at maximum levels when only
HC&S still cultivated cane and only about one fifth of the original
315
plantation acreage that these waters had previously irrigated.
As detailed in Part I, above, in June 2004, Maoli group, Hui o NƗ

309. See supra Part IV.A.
310. See supra Parts IV.B–C.
311. See supra Part IV.B.
312. See TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 15–16; Martin et al., supra note 62, at
90102.
313. See, e.g., Letter from Kent T. Lucien, Chief Exec. Officer, C. Brewer and Co., to the
Shareholders of Wailuku Agribusiness and C. Brewer and Co. (Oct. 3, 2005) (on file with
author) (explaining the history of and evolution from Wailuku Agribusiness to Wailuku
Water Company, LLC, as well as plans to market 27.5 mgd to new customers); Final D&O,
supra note 25, at 36.
314. See supra note 10.
315. See No Be Lolo! Get the Facts, EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/
files/library/factsheets/fiction-v-fact.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2011); Restore Stream Flow,
EARTHJUSTICE, http://earthjustice.org/our_work/campaigns/restore-stream-flow (last visited
Oct. 14, 2011).
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Wai ‘EhƗ, and environmental nonprofit, Maui Tomorrow Foundation,
partnered with the environmental litigation firm Earthjustice to petition
the water commission to restore continuous mauka to makai flow to NƗ
Wai ‘EhƗ’s communities, by amending the Interim Instream Flow
316
The Hui and its allies,
Standards (IIFSs) for the streams at issue.
especially OHA, deeply contextualized the issues within the broader
context of restorative justice for KƗnaka Maoli, detailing the water
commission’s constitutional, statutory, and moral obligations to restore
stream flows necessary to support Indigenous culture, communities,
lands and other resources, and to begin to redress the effects of 150
317
years of stream diversions.
WWC and HC&S (collectively, the Companies) objected to the
restoration of the streams, and an extended contested case
318
Over the course of ten months of
(administrative trial) ensued.
adjudicatory hearings, Water Commissioner and Hearings Officer Miike
received testimony from 77 witnesses and accepted over 600 exhibits
319
into evidence. After closely reviewing all of the submissions, on April
9, 2009, the hearings officer issued Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order recommending that the
water commission restore 34.5 mgd to NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s four streams and
320
communities.
Despite extensive findings regarding the cultural significance of
mauka to makai flow, the negative impacts of diversions on Maoli
321
culture, and the need for restoration, in June 2010, a majority of the
commission applied the same laws to the same evidence but arrived at a
dramatically different result that returned only 12.5 mgd to two of NƗ

316. See supra notes 1014 and accompanying text.
317. See generally TENGAN REPORT, supra note 2 (detailing the impacts of stream
diversions on Maui for the water commission).
318. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 6–8; see also HAW. ADMIN. R. § 13-167-2
(2011) (defining contested case as “a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges
of specific parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for an agency
hearing”); id. §§ 13-167-51 to -65 (establishing rules governing contested cases before the
water commission).
319. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 7.
320. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 187–89; see supra note 24.
321. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 12 (finding that testimony confirms that the
restoration of streamflow is critical for the perpetuation of Maoli culture, to support kalo
cultivation, and enable a connection to the land); see also supra note 14 (defining mauka to
makai flow).
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Wai ‘EhƗ’s four streams. 322 Rather than respecting the hearings officer’s
recommendation—as the most experienced commissioner and the only
one who participated in all of the hearings and reviewed all of the
323
evidence —a majority of the water commission, led by former Chair
Laura Thielen, deployed formalist analysis to benefit the sugar company
324
at the expense of Maoli rights, resources, and cultural survival.
325
He detailed
Hearings Officer Miike authored a scathing dissent.
the commission’s mandate to protect the public trust, including
traditional and customary Maoli rights and the environment, before
noting that “[t]he majority now turns all of these responsibilities on their
heads,” which in turn provided “the least protection feasible or no
326
He concluded that
protection at all to the waters of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ.”
“[b]y its decision, the majority has failed in its duties under the
Constitution and the State Water Code as trustee of the state’s public
327
water resources.”
B. Contextual Legal Analysis of the Water Commission’s Final Decision
and Order in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ
This section employs contextual legal analysis of KƗnaka Maoli
claims to deconstruct two aspects of the majority’s final order. In doing
so, it reveals the actual dynamics of the commission’s decision-making
with an emphasis on the value choices and interests implicated in
complex decisions like this one. This interrogation exposes that the
majority’s final decision was not “objectively determined” but a series of
value choices that consistently benefitted the Companies at the expense
of Native communities, resources, and culture.

322. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 18587 (detailing IIFSs).
323. See Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 7 (“This is my sixteenth year
involved in state water resources issues, first as a [c]ommissioner in the original WaiƗhole
Contested Case, then as a hearings officer for the two remands from the Hawai‘i Supreme
Court, and now again as a [c]ommissioner and the hearings officer in this contested case,
where I was the only [c]ommissioner to have heard and reviewed all the evidence.”).
324. Compare Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 17982, with Final
D&O, supra note 25, at 17980.
325. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23.
326. Id. at 2.
327. Id. at 7.

12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

12/13/2011 12:41 PM

WAI THROUGH KƖNƖWAI

193

1. Contextual Legal Analysis of Native Peoples’ Claims Exposes the
Injustice of Restoring Only Two of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s Four Great Waters
In NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, the principal issue involved IIFSs, which as detailed
in Part II.C., above, are the minimum amount of water that must remain
in a stream to restore and preserve KƗnaka Maoli and other beneficial
instream uses, including “[t]he protection of traditional and customary
328
Hawaiian rights” and the “maintenance of fish and wildlife habitats.”
Consistent with the Hawai‘i Supreme Court’s ruling that IIFSs are “the
primary mechanism by which the commission is to discharge its duty to
protect and promote the entire range of public trust purposes dependent
329
upon instream flows,” the Hui and its allies utilized this legal tool, with
the hope of restoring continuous mauka to makai flow to each of NƗ
Wai ‘EhƗ’s four communities.
Of the almost 70 mgd that the companies historically took from NƗ
Wai ‘EhƗ streams for over a century, the Hui and OHA jointly
requested 53.4 mgd to support a range of rights and uses reliant upon
mauka to makai flow, including traditional and customary Maoli
330
practices and environmental protection. The companies, on the other
331
In its final decision, the
hand, advocated a minimalist approach.
commission majority rejected key aspects of the hearings officer’s
recommendations, slashed the proposed IIFSs by two-thirds, and
328. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3 (1993) (defining IIFS and instream use). See supra Part
II.C for an in-depth discussion of IIFSs.
329. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d 409, 460 (Haw. 2000).
330. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 158 (noting that the Hui and OHA recommended
restoring 25.5 mgd to Waihe‘e River, 2.5 mgd to North Waiehu and 2.5 mgd to South Waiehu
Streams, 18.8 mgd to ‘Ʈao Stream, and 4.1 mgd to Waikapǌ Stream); see also Hui’s Proposed
Decision and Order at 36, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter Hui’s Proposed D&O].
331. WWC recommended restoring a total of 4.2 mgd divided among the four streams,
which would have kept the vast majority of water available for offstream use. See Final
D&O, supra note 25, at 15556 (observing that the WWC would have restored 1.4 mgd to
Waihe‘e River below all diversions, .5 mgd to North Waiehu and 0.5 mgd to South Waiehu
Stream below all diversions, 1.4 mgd to ‘Ʈao Stream below all diversions, and 0.4 mgd to
Waikapǌ Stream below all diversions); see also WWC’s Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision, and Order of Wailuku Water Co. at 79, 101, 116, and 131,
Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter WWC’s Proposed
D&O]. WWC’s proposed IIFSs “would be less than even the lowest flow” ever recorded in
the streams above all diversions. See Final D&O, supra note 25, at 15556. HC&S initially
suggested that the Commission split between 2.3 and 3.5 mgd amongst Waihe‘e River and
Waiehu Stream only, with no water for ‘Ʈao and Waikapǌ. Final D&O, supra note 25, 161.
HC&S later increased its “offer” after the hearings officer issued the Proposed Decision and
Order. See infra note 332.
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embraced HC&S’s initial proposal of restoring flow to Waihe‘e and
332
Waiehu only, with no water for ‘Ʈao and Waikapǌ Streams. Practically
speaking, this maintained the status quo for ‘Ʈao and Waikapǌ, leaving
those streams completely dewatered below the Companies’ diversions
and disregarding both the Native values and practices dependent upon
333
restored stream flows and legal directives to protect those interests.
This final order also allowed the Companies to continue plundering
Indigenous resources for their own profit in direct contravention of the
Constitution and Water Code.
The majority justified its actions by finding that ‘Ʈao and Waikapǌ
did not merit restoration after comparing “the importance of present or
potential instream values with the importance of present or potential
offstream uses of water for noninstream purposes, including the
334
economic impact of restricting such uses.” As the Final Decision and
Order made sure to note: “The law does not prescribe a specific method
335
for weighing that economic impact.”
The majority, therefore, reasoned that assessing whether Waikapǌ
Stream flowed continuously to the ocean “can be deferred until some
future time when the balancing of instream values and offstreams uses
336
might be more favorable.” The majority also concluded that ‘Ʈao did

332. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 161. HC&S would have restored 23 mgd to Waihe‘e
River below all diversions and 0.15 to 0.25 mgd to both North and South Waiehu Streams
below all diversions, but urged the Commission not to return any water to ‘Ʈao or Waikapǌ
because they are “not viable candidates for restoration” and, therefore, the Commission
“should deny the requests for amendment of their IIFS.” Id.; see also Hawaii Commercial &
Sugar Co. Proposed Decision and Order at 11314, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCHMA06-01 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter HC&S Proposed D&O]. At the final oral argument
before the water commission after the Proposed D&O was issued, HC&S upped its initial
offer, suggesting that the Commission restore 16.5 (from its initial offer of 2-3 mgd) to the
four streams. Transcript of Closing Argument at 23–24, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCHMA06-01 (Oct. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Closing Argument]. HC&S would have
restored 5 mgd to Waihe‘e River, 3.5 mgd to Waiehu Stream, 4 mgd to ‘Ʈao Stream, and 4
mgd to Waikapǌ Stream. Id.
333. The majority elected to restore flows at the “controlled release” rates proposed by
the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”) as part of a 20072008 scientific study to,
among other things, measure the amount of water the streams contribute to the underground
aquifer. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 180. USGS’s estimates neither comport with the
language of the law nor were they intended to be used as IIFSs. See supra note 30. By
comparison, USGS’s “controlled releases” are about one-third of the amount that the
hearings officer recommended restoring. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 180.
334. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 179 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D)).
335. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
336. Id. at 179. Although the majority did not say when this future time would be, it
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not deserve restoration because channelization in the stream’s lower
337
reaches posed challenges to the recruitment of native stream animals.
The majority characterized its decision as “follow[ing] the mandates of
the law as described in the Constitution, state statutes, and the Hawai‘i
Supreme Court decisions” and adopting “standards which the majority
felt represented the best balance of the mandated values and trust
338
After all, “[a]s in any difficult decision, reasonable
responsibilities.”
339
minds may reach different conclusions.”
In contending that its “balancing” complied with the law, the
majority sought refuge in formalist methodology, attempting to make its
outcome seem minimally plausible even though it was unsustainable on
the facts and law as highlighted by contextual legal analysis of Native
Peoples’ claims. Given this formalist approach, the range of contextual
factors—including impacts on cultural integrity, lands and other
resources, social welfare conditions, and self-governance—were either
deemed irrelevant or less relevant and the majority was free to disregard
strong evidence bolstering those values while still maintaining,
circularly, that it followed “the law.”
As demonstrated in this controversial case, the formalist method of
analysis hides the political and economic interests that influenced the
majority’s “balancing,” while also subverting the values that law was
340
For example, during the final oral argument,
designed to protect.
HC&S’s newly appointed Manager—and Alexander and Baldwin’s
(A&B’s) Chief Financial Officer (CFO)—assured the commissioners
suggested that the water commission’s separate process for issuing water use permits would
help to provide more information and protect environmental interests:
While the IIFS for [‘Ʈao] and Waikapǌ Streams are not amended, in the future
permitting process, permittees will have to measure or gauge the amounts they are
diverting to comply with their permits. Present diversion structures that disrupt
stream flows will have to be modified, in order to allow recruitment of stream life
past the diversions.
Id. at 188. The majority’s reasoning again failed to adequately consider the impacts on Native
culture, resources, and rights.
337. Id. at 180. The majority’s ruling contradicted expert and kama‘Ɨina (lay) testimony,
as well as its own findings, which “documented substantial amphidromous migration when
flow connected to the ocean for more than three or four days and thus anticipated that with
continuous flow, [native] species would reestablish into the upper reaches of ‘Ʈao Stream.” Id.
at 149–50 (Conclusion of Law 167(4)).
338. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
339. Id. (emphasis added).
340. See infra Part V.B.2.
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that while “[they] do not believe that there was any intent to shutdown
HC&S through the proposed IIFS[,] . . . [it] will be the end result if [the
341
commissioners] adopt the recommended decision.” After reciting the
342
claimed economic impacts of a shutdown, the CFO referenced
HC&S’s last ditch proposal to restore 16.5 mgd to NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ streams,
“an alternative IIFS that [they] believe better balances the offstream and
instream values of these four streams to the better benefit of the people
343
Those political drivers, especially the
of Maui and of the state.”
claimed economic impact of restricting HC&S’s practically free use of
NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ water, served the interests of Maui County’s largest
employer—and possibly the economy in general—and disserved
344
The majority’s one-sided “balancing”
Indigenous needs and values.
345
provided a critical foundation for its final decision.
Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims, however, reveals
the impropriety of formalist analysis, especially in “difficult” cases like
346
By broadening and deepening the analysis, the developing
this one.
framework establishes that the majority’s final IIFSs were “wrong on
the facts and law” because the underlying formalist analysis ignored the

341. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 24. For more information on
the potential economic impact of an HC&S shutdown, see infra Part V.B.2. In NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ
and other contested cases before the water commission, the practice has been to issue a
proposed decision, allow the parties to file written “exceptions” to that decision, hold oral
argument on the parties’ “exceptions” to the proposed decision, then issue a final decision
and order. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 78.
342. “HC&S employs about 800 full-time workers” on Maui and one of its subsidiaries
employs about another 17. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 137. As Maui County’s largest
employer, HC&S claimed “immediate impacts [of its shutdown] would include lost jobs and
in excess of $100 million of spending on Maui, generating approximately $250[ million]
annually to the County of Maui and State of Hawai‘i economies.” Final D&O, supra note 25,
at 137.
343. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 23–24 (emphasis added).
Interestingly enough, the Commission majority restored even less water to the streams than
HC&S requested at the final oral argument. Compare id., with Final D&O, supra note 25, at
18587 (detailing amended IIFSs).
344. See supra note 342 and accompanying text; HAWAIIAN COMMERCIAL & SUGAR
CO., http://www.hcsugar.com/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (noting that HC&S is one of the
largest employers on Maui).
345. See Final D&O, supra note 25, at 15580.
346. Compare Final D&O, supra note 25, at 12 (“Restoring streamflow to NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ
‘would enormously benefit’ Native Hawaiians and other communities who seek to reconnect
with their culture and live a self-sustaining lifestyle, and more people would be able to engage
in traditional and customary practices with more water.”), with Final D&O, supra note 25, at
188 (the Commission majority dismissed these and other cultural impacts and neglected to
restore water to ‘Ʈao and Waikapǌ streams).
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most significant factors for properly interpreting the relevant legal
language—impacts on cultural integrity, lands and other resources,
social welfare conditions, and self-governance. By twisting the legal
language, formalist analysis disguised the bare-knuckled political and
economic interests at play as well as the resulting “unjust”
consequences, which are measured by both Maoli values and interests,
and the larger community’s desires as reflected in the evolution of water
law in Hawai‘i (including the development of the Constitution and
347
Water Code and the contextual factors they embody).
Contrary to the majority’s characterization, Commissioner Miike
observed in his dissent that “[t]he amended IIFS were the amounts of
water remaining after all offstream requirements were met; i.e., a
348
residual—not a balanced—approach.” Commissioner Miike proposed
returning 14 mgd to Waihe‘e, 3.5 to Waiehu, 13 mgd to ‘Ʈao, and 4 mgd
349
350
This
to Waikapǌ, with the remainder available for offstream use.
would have reduced the amount of water previously available for
HC&S, WWC, and other offstream diverters to about half their historic
rates and would have required HC&S to use one of its wells to
supplement the stream water it takes during summer months when flows
351
are lower.
In issuing his proposed ruling, the hearings officer examined the
evidence and employed contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’
claims, consistent with the “justice principles” embodied in Hawai‘i
352
The hearings officer’s analysis specifically considered the
water law.
context of Hawai‘i water law, such as Maoli rights and interests that
347. See supra note 68; see also Final D&O, supra note 25, at 12 (“Restoration of mauka
to makai flow to the streams is critical to the perpetuation and practice of Hawaiian culture in
NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ.’ ‘If we are not able to maintain our connection to the land and water and teach
future generations our cultural traditions, we lose who we are as a people.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
348. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 4 (emphasis in original).
349. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 180.
350. Id. Hearings Officer Miike recommended an almost even split of water between
the Hui and its allies who sought stream restoration and the Companies who wanted to
continue taking water for their private use. Id.
351. Id. at 18081; see also infra Part V.B.2 (analyzing the majority’s decision regarding
the practicability of alternate sources of water). Hearings Officer Miike also recommended
approving the following water use permits: 2.4 mgd to Maui County for municipal uses and
0.1 mgd to HC&S for agricultural water uses. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note
20, at 191. Hearings Officer Miike recommended denying WWC’s water use permit
applications. Id. at 19192.
352. See supra Part II.
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were subverted by the majority’s formalist methodology. He considered
the history of this area and the plantation industry’s prior and
continuing impacts on KƗnaka Maoli cultural integrity, social welfare
conditions, lands and other resources, and other Indigenous values;
specifically, he considered the contextual factors of Hawai‘i water law,
such as Maoli rights and interests, that were subverted by the majority’s
formalist methodology. The hearings officer’s deeper contextualization
informed his balancing of instream values versus offstream needs, and
he proposed a decision that revealed the true impacts of the outcome on
Hawai‘i’s Indigenous People and resources while also seeking to redress
the harms of colonization through stream diversions in particular,
consistent with the evolution and intent of Hawai‘i water law.
The hearings officer examined the Companies’ 150-year history of
stream diversions in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ and the impact on natural resources
and Indigenous culture. He gave credence to the “uncontroverted
testimony regarding limitations on Native Hawaiians’ ability to exercise
traditional and customary . . . practices in the greater NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ area
due to the lack of freshwater flowing in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s streams and into
353
nearshore marine waters,” and took that into account in seeking to
fulfill the state’s public trust obligations toward stream resources and
KƗnaka Maoli in particular.
The hearings officer also considered the cultural benefits of restored
stream flows and the importance of beginning to rectify past harms to
lands and other resources. He found that “NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ continues to
hold the potential to once again support enhanced traditional and
354
customary rights and practices if sufficient water is restored,” and that
the “[r]estoration of mauka to makai flow to the streams is critical to the
355
He
perpetuation and practice of Hawaiian culture in” this area.
understood that if Native practitioners “are not able to maintain [their]
connection to the land and water and to teach future generations [their]
356
cultural traditions, [they] lose who [they] are as a people.”
The hearings officer contemplated improved social welfare
conditions that would result from restored flow, especially for KƗnaka
353. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 10.
354. Id. at 11.
355. Id. at 12.
356. Id. Regarding impacts to lands and other resources, Hearings Officer Miike also
recognized that “[a]n overriding factor impairing the biological and ecological integrity of
diverted Central Maui streams, compared to their non-diverted counterparts, is the disruption
of natural flow via large-scale offstream diversions.” Id. at 14.
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Maoli. He found that returning water to the streams to support cultural
practices “will result in the betterment of the conditions of native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians by restoring spiritual well-being and a state of
‘pono’ (goodness, righteousness, balance) to the people and
357
He also acknowledged that the
communities of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ.”
rejuvenation of cultural practices, especially “[k]alo cultivation[,]
provides not only a source of food, but also spiritual sustenance,
promotes community awareness and a connection to the land, and
358
supports physical fitness and mental well-being.” The Final Decision
and Order included these same findings while diluting others, and yet
the majority’s “balancing” effectively negated the hearings officer’s
findings in favor of the Companies.
The hearings officer’s proposed order did not explicitly address selfgovernance issues for KƗnaka Maoli. It did, however, give meaning to
the relevant legal language in ways that were consistent with Indigenous
self-determination and would have significantly redressed the historical
359
conditions of completely dewatered streams imposed by colonizers.
On its face, the language of the law governing IIFSs promotes stream
protection and restoration, while also giving credence to the same values
360
considered in contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims. The
Constitution and Water Code direct the commission to protect and
361
The law’s expansive
restore instream uses to the extent practicable.
language reflects a broad accommodation of interests and values,
including specific safeguards for Indigenous interests. For example, the
Code makes clear that traditional and customary KƗnaka Maoli rights,
362
363
along with appurtenant rights “shall not be abridged or denied.”
Despite this underlying accommodation and the explicit protections and
preferences for “public trust purposes,” such as KƗnaka Maoli cultural
357. Id. at 12.
358. Id.; see also id. at 1112.
359. See, e.g., id. at 112 (emphasizing that Maoli traditional and customary rights may
not be abandoned and are enforceable even if a practice has not been continuously exercised,
which supports self-determination and cultural sovereignty).
360. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D).
361. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d 409, 467 (Haw. 2000); see also HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 7; HAW.
REV. STAT. § 174C-71(4) (requiring the Commission to “[e]stablish an instream flow program
to protect, enhance, and reestablish, where practicable, beneficial instream uses of water”).
The Code identifies nine beneficial instream uses. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-3; supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 36 (defining appurtenant rights).
363. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c)–(d) (1993).
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practices and environmental protection, 364 the actual language of the law
(such as “to the extent practicable”) is general enough to enable
formalist analysis to generate legal outcomes that might initially appear
plausible but that actually disserve the intended accommodation of
365
these interests and values.
As demonstrated by the analysis above, even when armed with the
protective language of the law, the legal process has the potential to
yield a wide range of outcomes as decision-makers are influenced by a
broad spectrum of explicit and implicit forces—including personal
values and economic interests—that shape how decision-makers
interpret and apply the law broadly or narrowly depending upon the
366
Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’
select facts of any case.
claims reveals a far more appropriate interpretation and application of
the relevant legal language, which is also consistent with the law’s initial
framing.
The hearings officer’s proposed decision, even with
367
shortcomings, would have achieved a more just result for KƗnaka
364. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 44849; see also id. at 448 (“acknowledg[ing] resource
protection, with its numerous derivative public uses, benefits, and values, as an important
underlying purpose of the reserved water resources trust”); id. at 449 (“uphold[ing] the
exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional and customary rights as a public trust purpose”);
id. at 454 (“[T]he constitutional requirements of ‘protection’ and ‘conservation,’ the historical
and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public rights, and the common
reality of the ‘zero-sum’ game between competing water uses demand that any balancing
between public and private purposes begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access,
and enjoyment.”).
365. Id. at 467. In this case, instream values include the environmental and cultural
benefits advocated by the Hui and its allies and noninstream purposes include WWC and
HC&S’s use of diverted stream water for their private commercial profit. See HAW. REV.
STAT. § 174C-3 (defining instream and noninstream uses); see also supra note 17 and
accompanying text (defining instream uses).
366. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 131, at 470 (“[L]egal rules were often vague and
therefore ambiguous. Since these rules often combined abstract and contestable concepts, . . .
they were subject to broad interpretation. Reasonable persons could disagree about what
these concepts meant; thus judges could not apply them mechanically.”).
367. Although significantly more balanced than the majority’s Final Decision and Order,
both the Hui and OHA objected to various aspects of the hearings officer’s Proposed
Decision and Order. In the context of Maoli rights and interests, for example, both parties
took issue with the hearings officer’s treatment of kuleana or appurtenant rights, which attach
to land that was in cultivation, often in the traditional staple kalo, when private property was
instituted in Hawai‘i. See, e.g., Hui o NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ and Maui Tomorrow Foundation, Inc.’s
Exceptions to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order at 19–
26, Contested Case Hearing, No. CCH-MA06-01 (May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Hui’s Exceptions
to Proposed D&O]. In particular, both the Hui and OHA raised concerns about the hearings
officer’s refusal to make determinations on undisputed appurtenant rights, disinclination to
require the Companies to continue supplying water to kuleana right holders, and
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Maoli, agribusiness, and the Hawai‘i community at large.
2. Contextual Legal Analysis of Native Peoples’ Claims Uncovers the
Economic Interests at Play in Determining the “Practicability” of
Alternate Water Sources
A second example of the dangers presented by the majority’s
formalist methodology involves the assessment of alternate sources of
368
water. Because fresh water in Hawai‘i is part of a public trust, no one
can own the resource; instead, the water commission balances rights and
369
priorities of water use. If individuals or companies want to use water,
they bear the burden of demonstrating both actual water needs and the
absence of practicable alternatives, such as using another source of
370
water or making their current use more efficient. Because the public
trust establishes certain beneficial instream uses—such as Native
practices and environmental protection—“as the norm or ‘default’
condition,” it creates a higher level of scrutiny for private commercial
uses and places the burden of justifying those uses on the water
commission and commercial users (as opposed to the public trust
371
In this way, both the Constitution and Water Code
purposes).
embody restorative justice principles, including the contextual factors
vital to any legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims.
Enforcing this legal burden of proof was an onerous task in NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ because the parties bitterly disagreed about how much water the
miscalculation of the amount of water necessary to enable and restore these constitutionally
and statutorily guaranteed interests. Id. Compare Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra
note 20, at 3336, 11820, with HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-63 (“Appurtenant rights are
preserved. Nothing in this part shall be construed to deny the exercise of an appurtenant
right by the holder thereof at any time.”).
368. The analysis regarding the practicability of alternatives also includes making uses
more efficient, e.g., lining ditches and reservoirs, in addition to using other sources of water,
e.g., ground water wells or reclaimed wastewater. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at
107110, 134 (regarding reclaimed wastewater); id. at 134 (regarding lining ditches and
reservoirs). Although the water commission addressed these issues, they will not be discussed
here due to space constraints. See, e.g., id. at 134.
369. WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 45354.
370. Id. at 47374; Final D&O, supra note 25, at 112–13. The Commission has defined
practicable as “available and capable of being used after taking into consideration cost,
existing technology, and logistics.” Final D&O, supra, at 116 (citing WaiƗhole II, 93 P.3d 643,
661 (Haw. 2004)).
371. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 11213 (quoting WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 454).
Moreover, “[t]he Commission ‘is not obligated to ensure that any particular user enjoys a
subsidy or guaranteed access to less expensive water sources when alternatives are available
and public values are at stake.’” Id. at 116 (citing WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d at 48485).

12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

202

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 12:41 PM

[95:127

Companies actually needed and whether alternate sources of water,
372
The commission
especially ground water wells, were practicable.
focused its attention on HC&S because prior to the administrative trial,
that company alone was using roughly eighty percent of the water
diverted from the streams, significantly more than all other users
373
combined.
After considering the evidence in light of the relevant legal
language, the commission majority determined that Well No. 7 was a
practicable alternative and that HC&S could pump up to 9.5 mgd of
ground water from that source during summer months instead of taking
374
By deeming less than half of Well No. 7’s past use
stream water.
“practicable” for only several months each year, the majority allowed
HC&S to continue using NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ streams as its main irrigation
375
source for the West Maui Fields and relieved HC&S of the obligation
376
This enabled HC&S to avoid
to pump Well No. 7 at previous rates.
using internally generated electricity to pump its well (fueled by burning
a byproduct of its sugar production) and instead, keep selling that
377
electricity to the local utility for windfall profits.

372. Id. at 119–30 (discussing actual water needs and the majority’s ultimate decision).
373. Id. at 210. This analysis focuses on HC&S only. For more information on WWC,
Maui County, or any of the other uses, see id. at 3238. For general background, in 2006,
HC&S used roughly 41.92 mgd, WWC used 2.37 mgd, and Maui Department of Water Supply
used 2.84. Id. at 210.
374. Id. at 171. HC&S argued that “as currently configured, Well No. 7 can supply only
14 mgd to the Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields.” Id. at 85, 130–31. Hearings Officer Miike
recommended and the majority agreed, however, that “HC&S’s records do not indicate that
Well No. 7 was ever configured differently than its current configuration.” Id. at 85.
375. “Approximately 5,300 acres of HC&S’s sugar plantation, or about 15 percent of the
roughly 35,000 acres HC&S uses for sugar cane cultivation, are located in HC&S’s ‘West
Maui Fields,’” which are irrigated with NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ stream water. Proposed D&O, supra
note 20, at 66. The West Maui Fields consist of: (1) the Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields (3950 acres)
that HC&S owns and irrigates with water from Waihe‘e River and ‘Ʈao and Waiehu Streams
via the Wai‘ale reservoir; and (2) the ‘Ʈao-Waikapǌ fields (1350 acres), former WWC lands,
most of which HC&S now leases and currently irrigates with water from ‘Ʈao, Waikapǌ, and
Waiehu Streams and Waihe‘e River. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 3840; Hearings Officer’s
Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 6668. HC&S irrigates the rest of its plantationabout
30,000 acreswith stream water that it diverts from rural, predominantly Maoli communities
in East Maui. See Summer Sylva, Indigenizing Water Law in the 21st Century: Na
Mokuaupuni o Koolau Hui, A Native Hawiian Case Study, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
563, 564 (2007) (overviewing the East Maui water issue).
376. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 171 (regarding prior pumping rates). Despite the
historical average of 19 mgd, “[b]etween 1927 and 1985, HC&S pumped an average of about
21 mgd from Well No. 7.” Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 130.
377. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 171. The majority’s determination would “not
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The majority’s ruling was difficult to justify using even formalist
methods because neither HC&S nor the majority could meet the legal
burden of demonstrating the “absence of practicable alternatives” when
HC&S had historically used only one-third of the water diverted from
NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ streams and maintained a battery of 16 non-potable
378
In fact, the majority itself
agricultural wells to irrigate its fields.
determined that “[f]rom 1927 until additional NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ water
became available in the 1980s, HC&S’s primary source of irrigation
water for its Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields was Well No. 7,” not NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ
379
Despite its own findings regarding HC&S’s longtime
streams.
alternatives, the majority employed a narrow interpretation of the term
“practicable” to reach its desired outcome. The majority concluded that
“[a]n alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being used
380
after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics.”
It then acknowledged that “Well No. 7 historically had pumped
381
approximately 19 mgd,” but justified its determination of only 9.5 mgd
as a “practicable” alternative by citing potential costs that HC&S might
382
be forced to incur to install new pumps and lost profits from selling
383
electricity to the power company, and ultimately focusing on the
require capital costs, only the costs of pumping.” Id. Moreover, HC&S historically used
electricity generated at its mill to pump its wells. Andrew Gomes, HC&S, Last Sugar Cane
Plantation, on Track toward More Financial Losses, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 15,
2009, available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2009/Nov/15/ln/hawaii911150370.ht
ml. Since the 1980s when NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ water became “available,” HC&S has sold that
electricity for private profit. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 89.
378. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 41–42 (documenting prior sharing of Waihe‘e and
Spreckels Ditch flows with WWC’s predecessor in interest); see also id. at 39 (regarding
HC&S’s sixteen non-potable wells). “Since the additional NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ flows became
available, HC&S has minimized its use of Well No. 7,” but used it heavily in 1996 and 2000
when it pumped an average of 25 and 19 mgd, respectively. Id. at 84. Non-potable water is
not suitable for drinking, but may still be used for other purposes depending on its quality,
including agricultural irrigation.
379. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 84. Moreover, “[b]etween 1927 and 1985, HC&S
pumped an average of about 21 mgd from Well No. 7.” Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted);
see also id. at 130.
380. Id. at 116 (citing WaiƗhole I, 9 P.3d 409, 661 (Haw. 2000)).
381. Id. at 171; see supra note 376 and accompanying text (noting historical rates of
pumpage).
382. Id. at 171 (acknowledging that Well No. 7 has two pumps and one booster pump,
but that “[a]n additional 14 mgd booster pump would incur costs of $1 million, and $475,000
in infrastructure costs”).
383. Id. (noting that “HC&S also claims that there would be constraints on the power to
run the pumps on a consistent and sustained basis because of its power contract with” Maui
Electric Company).

12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

204

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 12:41 PM

[95:127

possible impacts on the ground water source if the well was again
pumped at historic rates that exceed the aquifer’s nominal sustainable
384
In doing so, the majority was able to conclude that “the
yield.
385
practical alternative from Well No. 7 is lower than historic rates.”
The majority employed a formalist approach to determine that it was
“practicable” for HC&S to periodically pump only 9.5 mgd from Well
No. 7 even though that was unsustainable on the facts and the law, as
demonstrated here. Such a flattened construction of the relevant legal
term and an application that focused on pumping exceeding the
aquifer’s sustainable yield (which the commission knew about and
allowed for years without any alleged adverse effect) was possible only
if the majority ignored key aspects of the controversy (such as HC&S’s
history of using this well in addition to the four values of contextual
386
Despite these inherent
legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims).
contradictions, the majority zeroed in on this issue to protect the
company’s interests rather than the Hui’s or the resources’ rights. The
majority, therefore, employed formalist methodology to attempt to
impart an air of minimal plausibility to its inordinately narrow view of
the pertinent legal language and “relevant” facts. This rationale also
masked the majority’s apparent economic motivation, which in turn
silenced the larger historical context of Hawai‘i history and Indigenous
Peoples’ claims in particular.
As demonstrated here, the formalist method and its focus on
sustainable yield attempted to obscure the political interests that were
the actual drivers of the majority’s ruling. For example, throughout the
extensive hearings, HC&S decried the economic impacts of restricting

384. Id. The majority observed that
The combined facts that the current sustainable yield of the aquifer is already being
exceeded; that increased pumping from Well No. 7 may exacerbate that strain; and
that the historically higher levels of pumping occurred during a period where furrow
irrigation methods were affecting recharge rates for the aquifer, the practical
alternative from Well No. 7 is lower than historic rates.
Id. Sustainable yield is the maximum rate at which water can be pumped from an
aquifer while still maintaining the integrity of that ground water source. See HAW. REV.
STAT. § 174C-3.
385. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 171.
386. See supra Part II.A.1 (overviewing legal formalism). Since formalist analysis
assumes that the law is rationally determinate, judging is mechanical, and the legal process
itself is sufficient to mete out “justice,” decision-makers use that methodology to minimize
contextual factors. Id.
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its free access to NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ water, arguing “[i]f reductions in HC&S’s
use of stream waters were of such a magnitude as to force HC&S not to
cultivate the 5300 acres that comprise the West Maui Fields, HC&S
387
would not be a viable plantation.” In particular, HC&S claimed that
“its survival hinges on the [1350-acre] ‘Ʈao-Waikapǌ fields having
388
sufficient NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ water to irrigate them.”
These threats were not without political weight; “HC&S employs
about 800 full-time workers” on Maui and one of its subsidiaries
389
As Maui County’s largest employer,
employs about another 17.
HC&S claimed “immediate impacts [of its shutdown] would include lost
jobs and in excess of $100 million of spending on Maui, generating
approximately $250[ million] annually to the County of Maui and State
390
of Hawai‘i economies.”
HC&S’s pressure tactics escalated once the hearings officer
recommended restoring about half of the water the Companies usually
391
At the closing oral argument before the full
take from the streams.
392
commission, A&B’s CFO emerged on HC&S’s behalf. Though he had
never previously appeared in the case and professed a lack of familiarity
with the administrative record, the CFO announced that he expected “a

387. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 13637. Along the same lines, HC&S also argued
“that maintaining the number of acres it has in sugar cultivation is necessary to remain
economically viable.” Id. at 140. It also claimed the “West Maui Fields provide the most
productive yields of all of HC&S’s cultivated lands,” making them “critical” to HC&S’s
continued existence. Id. at 137.
388. Id. at 140 (emphasis added). HC&S claimed that reductions in its use of NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ stream water would result in
lost jobs and in excess of $100[ million] of spending on Maui, closure of HC&S will
have a deleterious effect on efforts to promote agriculture and curb urbanization in
Hawai‘i. The withdrawal of HC&S’ 35,000 acres of prime agricultural lands from
sugar would vastly increase the agricultural lands in the State of Hawai‘i and on
Maui that are idle.
Id. at 90. At the same time that it was arguing that it needed every last drop of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ
Water for its very “survival,” HC&S’s parent company Alexander and Baldwin was discussing
the possibility of a plant to treat up to 9 mgd from Waihe‘e and ‘Ʈao Streams for use by A&B
and Maui County in various urban development initiatives. Id. at 47.
389. Id. at 137.
390. Id.
391. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (explaining the water commission’s
contested case hearing process whereby the parties view the proposed decision and present
oral and written argument on issues they would like changed before the Commission issues a
final decision).
392. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 28.

12 - SPROAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

206

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/13/2011 12:41 PM

[95:127

decision and determination on the future of HC&S” within a few
393
months. Threats of an HC&S shutdown and the potential impacts of
ordering HC&S to once again use its longtime non-potable well that was
the actual source of water for its fields, influenced the majority’s
determination of the “practicability” of alternate sources. Those threats
also outweighed the impacts of the majority’s factual findings on
Indigenous efforts to reclaim land, resurrect culture, and restore natural
resources essential to traditional practices in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, subverting
both these contextual factors and the law’s original design to protect and
394
restore those interests.
Critical legal analysis reveals that the language of most substantive
rules (such as whether an alternative is “practicable”) may be
manipulated and applied selectively to specific facts (for example, the
safety of pumping Well No. 7 at historic rates) so that the decisionmakers’ ultimate choice furthers his or her own political and economic
395
Here, the hearings officer and majority applied the
philosophies.
same facts to the same legal principles but arrived at starkly different
conclusions.
In NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, the “boogeyman of an HC&S
396
shutdown” weighed heavily on the commission majority. Despite its
own findings that HC&S had historically used only a fraction of the
397
water it was currently banking, had voluntarily reduced its own
398
acreage, and had not attempted to acquire the leased fields it now
399
claimed were vital to its very “survival,” in the end, claimed economic

393. Id. at 21.
394. See, e.g., Final D&O, supra note 25, at 67, 17475.
395. Id. at 116 (defining practicable alternative).
396. Transcript of Closing Argument, supra note 332, at 21.
397. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 4445, 12425.
398. The hearings officer proposed a finding and the majority agreed that although
HC&S claimed it needed to maintain its cultivated acreage to “remain economically viable,”
records from HC&S’ parent company A&B revealed that “from 2000 through 2005, HC&S
decreased its cultivated acreage by more than 2000 acres . . . . Moreover, A&B ha[d]
development plans that would remove almost 3500 additional acres from cultivation.”
Id. at 140.
399. Regarding HC&S’s claims that NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ water for the leased, 1350-acre ‘ƮaoWaikapǌ Fields was vital to the survival of its 35,000-acre plantation, the hearings officer
proposed and the Commission majority ruled that HC&S “made no apparent attempt to
acquire those lands when they became available. HC&S had no written agreement with
WWC after July 2003, when WWC refused to extend the land lease and announced HC&S
was ‘no longer entitled to any water allocation’” under the Companies’ water sharing
agreement. Id. at 140; see also id. at 93 (discussing HC&S’s claims that “its survival hinges on
the ‘Ʈao-Waikapǌ Fields” but making no apparent attempt to acquire them when they were
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impacts carried the most weight with the commission majority,
informing its determination of practicability and other issues and
overshadowing the law’s original design and specific mandate to protect
400
and restore Indigenous rights and interests. Contextual legal analysis
of Native Peoples’ claims uncovers these and other limitations of
formalist analysis. Broadening the analysis to alternatives that are truly
“practicable” for HC&S from a historical and cultural perspective
demonstrates that the majority’s ruling on this issue was unduly narrow
and motivated by economic interests and small town politics—not the
401
safety of pumping the well at prior rates, as formalist analysis claimed.
Contextual legal analysis exposes who truly benefits from the
majority’s decision that largely maintained the status quo in NƗ Wai
‘EhƗ streams and communities (interests who have monopolized water
resources for over a century). It also reveals who is harmed by the
status quo (disenfranchised communities, including KƗnaka Maoli and
other people of color), who interprets the status quo (a commission of
political appointees, not elected officials), and what is really at stake if
the rules are “formalistically” applied (Hawai‘i’s water future). When
the framework is shifted and the right questions are incorporated into
how the language of the law is construed and applied, then the law
creates the potential to achieve its original intent of realizing justice for
KƗnaka Maoli and all of Hawai‘i’s people.
Commissioner Miike sharply dissented, noting that his “most
available for sale.).
400. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-71(2)(D) (outlining Commission’s duty to
balance instream values and offstream uses), with HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101(c)–(d)
(maintaining that Native rights, including “traditional and customary rights . . . shall not be
abridged or denied by this chapter”), HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-63, Final D&O, supra note
25, at 10 (finding that “[c]ultural experts and community witnesses provided uncontroverted
testimony regarding limitations on Native Hawaiians’ ability to exercise traditional and
customary rights and practices in the greater NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ area due to the lack of freshwater
flowing in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ’s streams and into the nearshore marine waters”), and Final D&O,
supra note 25, at 185–87 (restoring no water to ‘Ʈao and Waikapǌ Streams).
401. See An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, supra note 93, at 2.
In the end, the route taken did not matter. The result was the same. Streams
and the wildlife they support, and those seeking their restoration, whether for
customary stream uses or for environmental reasons, lost out. A&B[, HC&S],
Wailuku Water Company, and Maui County, which has come to rely on HC&S as a
kind of wholesale provider of water to the county municipal system, won out. To be
sure, some streams will see a bit more water in their lower reaches, but the total
amount restored to streams is embarrassingly small.
Id.
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significant difference” from the majority “is the assignment of 9.5 mgd
402
Both
to HC&S’s Well No. 7 as a practicable alternative.”
Commissioner Miike and the majority “agree[d] that Well No. 7 should
be used only during dry-weather conditions, when available stream
flows are insufficient to meet offstream requirements, but then the
403
He
majority arbitrarily reduce[d] Well No. 7’s capacity in half.”
charged that “the majority, without any credible foundation chose 9.5
mgd as the practicable alternative from Well No. 7 to protect HC&S’s
404
Further,
interests, to the detriment of the stream resources.”
Commissioner Miike’s dissent concluded that “[b]y reducing Well No. 7
as a practical alternative from approximately 19 mgd to 9.5 mgd, [‘Ʈao]
405
Stream’s restoration gave way to HC&S’s irrigation requirements.”
As detailed in Part V.B.1, above, the hearings officer attempted to
contextualize the issues, considering the practicability of HC&S’s
alternate sources in light of over a century of stream diversions and their
continued impact on cultural integrity, lands and other resources, social
406
welfare conditions, and self-governance. He understood that over 150
years of almost zero flow in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ streams subjugated ancestral
lands, resources, and rights, while at the same time creating deplorable
402. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 2. After weighing all of the evidence,
Hearings Officer Miike recommended that “fourteen mgd from Well. No. 7 is a reasonable
alternative for the Waihe‘e-Hopoi Fields.” Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20,
at 168.
403. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 2 (emphasis added).
404. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The hearings officer also pointed out that “[a]bsent an
economic analysis by HC&S, the Commission cannot assume that HC&S’s doomsday
scenario would result from an occasional 10.5 to 13.4 percent decrease in its irrigation
requirements for 15 percent of its entire operations.” Id. at 6. Especially since HC&S
strategically neglected to include an economic analysis so that it could “leap to its doomsday
scenario—the drastic consequences to Maui county and the state if it were to close its entire
sugar operations.” Id. Commissioner Miike determined that
if reductions in its use of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ stream water were of such a magnitude as to
force HC&S not to cultivate the 5300 acres that comprise the West Maui Fields,
HC&S would not be a viable operation. But rather than providing an analysis of
the magnitude of reductions that would lead to that result, HC&S instead outlined
the consequences if its entire 35,000 acre sugar operations were ended.
Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n the absence of any information supporting its
doomsday scenario, the Commission could not assume that HC&S’s assertions overcame the
presumption in favor of the public trust resource, the streams of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ.” Id. at 67.
405. Id. at 2.
406. See supra Part V.B.1 (considering the four Indigenous values for contextual legal
analysis in the context of stream restoration in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ); Hearings Officer’s Proposed
D&O, supra note 20, at 83.
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social welfare conditions for KƗnaka Maoli in particular. 407
In addition, the hearings officer grasped that, although requiring
HC&S to continue to utilize its “primary source” of irrigation water that
it had used without complaint for almost 100 years would impose some
financial costs, failing to do so would continue to require Hawai‘i’s
natural resources and Indigenous culture to subsidize HC&S’s private
commercial business; it would also perpetuate the historical stream
diversions and resulting conditions imposed by colonizers, their
408
descendants, and, now, shareholders. The hearings officer considered
these larger policy concerns in light of the commission’s duty to KƗnaka
Maoli, including the fact that “restoration of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ waters is of
importance for traditional and customary purposes,” and that, “in
addition to its duty to resolve uncertainty in favor of resource
protection, the commission has a duty to take feasible actions to
409
reasonably protect native Hawaiian rights.” In doing so, the hearings
officer gave meaning to the relevant legal language in ways that were
consistent with Hawai‘i’s history, current socio-economic conditions,
and the values of Indigenous self-determinationall of which shaped,
and to some extent are already reflected in, the law itself. Although less
410
than perfect, the hearings officer’s proposed decision better balanced
the four values of restorative justice for Native Peoples in a manner that
moved the commission closer to providing na‘au pono for the Hui, its
allies, and all of Hawai‘i’s people.
VI. CONCLUSION
The water commission majority highlighted the challenges that it
faced in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ: “Mark Twain’s witticism that ‘whiskey is for
drinking and water is for fighting’ is apropos, given the immense task of
establishing instream flow standards in regions where there is
insufficient surface water to meet the cumulative needs of resources and
411
But the commission’s ultimate chore in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ was no
uses.”
more difficult or complex than the host of other legal controversies
407. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 1 (acknowledging the importance of Maoli traditional
and customary rights, including water rights); see also sources cited supra note 243 (detailing
Maoli social welfare conditions).
408. Hearings Officer’s Proposed D&O, supra note 20, at 128.
409. Hearings Officer’s Dissent, supra note 23, at 3.
410. See supra note 367 (highlighting some of the shortcomings of the hearings officer’s
Proposed Decision and Order).
411. Final D&O, supra note 25, at 191.
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around the world that involve Native Peoples’ struggle for selfdetermination through varying forms of environmental justice. And like
those cases, perhaps the most significant challenge for the water
commission was to meaningfully consider the rights and interests of
Indigenous groups, who seek na‘au pono—that deep sense of justice
people can feel in their gut, in the midst of a political firestorm.
In NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, Hawai‘i’s comprehensive legal regime for water
resource management embodied the necessary factors for the contextual
legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims. As detailed herein, state
constitutional provisions, Hawai‘i’s Water Code, and the common law,
provide specific protections for the environment and Native rights and
practices, even though the ultimate expression of those values is broad.
By employing formalist methodology and minimizing those contextual
factors, the commission majority took that more general legal language
and applied it to select facts to generate an outcome that appeared
minimally plausible, but was ultimately unsustainable on the facts and
the law.
By contrast, contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims
surfaced those necessary factors—particularly KƗnaka Maoli values and
interests and the public trust—in a way that breathed new life into
dormant constitutional and statutory provisions and that was also
consistent with the law’s initial framing. This analytical framework was
critical in illuminating more informed conceptions of water in the law as
well as unpacking the political and economic influences that shaped how
rights were actually determined. In this way, contextual legal analysis of
Native Peoples’ claims provides a discrete method for ascertaining a
more just result for Indigenous Peoples and an outcome that is
consistent with how Hawai‘i law was intended to accommodate
competing rights and interests.
Given these complexities, at the outset, Indigenous and other
advocates must ensure that legal rules acknowledge and embody the key
values of cultural integrity, lands and other resources, social welfare,
and self-governance. In addition, when controversies arise, these same
communities and groups must rally to ensure that advocates and
decision-makers employ contextual legal analysis for Native Peoples’
claims rather than formalist methodologies. Advocates must actively
pursue dual strategies of shaping and enforcing the law. Otherwise, as
demonstrated here, even when the law itself embodies contextual
factors, formalist methods can still be deployed to undermine both those
values and the larger quest for na‘au pono.
Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims, especially in the
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context of NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, reveals the promise and potential of the legal
process, when appropriately linked to community organizing and other
change agents, to create opportunities for liberation and justice.
Because even when armed with the protective language of the law,
contextual legal analysis is necessary to begin to contemplate the deep
sense of justice that Native Peoples seek. Without this important tool,
decision-makers will continue to deploy formalist methodologies to
subvert Indigenous values and claims in NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ and beyond.
Contextual legal analysis of Native Peoples’ claims, therefore, is vital for
those pursuing justice through law. In NƗ Wai ‘EhƗ, the Hui and its
allies will continue to seek wai through kƗnƗwai, employing legal and
other available tools until they are successful in restoring water to
Hawai‘i’s streams and justice to Maoli communities.

